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INTRODUCTION 
Cosmopolitanism has a bad name in law. Its tenets are routinely 
dismissed as naïve, sloppy, or even disingenuous. Cosmopolitans are 
seen as committed to a world government in stark oblivion of a political 
reality that continues to revolve around state sovereignty.1 The “dream”2 
 
 †  Associate Professor, Boston College Law School and Director, Clough Center for the 
Study of Constitutional Democracy, Boston College. I thank Paulo Barrozo, Mattias Kumm, 
Frank Michelman, Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, and Katie Young for comments on earlier drafts. 
The usual disclaimer applies. A grant from the Boston College Law School Fund supported this 
project.   
 1 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, State Sovereignty is Not Withering Away: A Few Lessons for the 
Future, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26, 27–37 (Antonio 
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of uniting the world assumes that individuals have obligations toward 
one another across and irrespective of borders simply by virtue of 
belonging to the human race. But these are at most moral obligations, 
and it takes a sloppy jurist to derive legal duty from moral obligation. 
Furthermore, lofty goals of world unity deflate when given institutional 
form, hence the noted tendency of cosmopolitans to gloss over issues of 
enforcement. So basic is the skill of separating law from morality and so 
strikingly utopian are the cosmopolitan tenets that, critics conclude, 
persistence must be cover for something else: “scratch a cosmopolitan 
and you’ll find an imperialist just below the surface.”3 
This harsh indictment has more or less obliterated 
cosmopolitanism from contemporary legal discourse. With few 
exceptions, drawn, unsurprisingly, from the ranks of international 
lawyers or from among scholars of the European Union,4 the label 
“cosmopolitan” has become anathema. Even the case for 
cosmopolitanism reinforces the indictment. In order to be “useful in the 
real world,” one scholar argues, cosmopolitanism must be de-
radicalized; it must be “understood to engage actual political duties, not 
to demonstrate their evanescence and unimportance.”5 
Cosmopolitanism will not get a seat at the table with the grown-ups 
unless it accommodates “plausibility constraints.”6 
But domestication is the wrong cure, just as radicalism is the wrong 
diagnosis. Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which remains the most complex 
and influential account, rejects the above assumptions in no uncertain 
terms. In the words of one commentator, “[a] core issue for political 
 
Cassese ed., 2012) (arguing for the resilience of state sovereignty despite accounts of its 
disappearance or disintegration).   
 2 See David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the 
Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641 (2007). 
 3 GARRETT WALLACE BROWN, GROUNDING COSMOPOLITANISM: FROM KANT TO THE IDEA 
OF A COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTION 126–27 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(mentioning this view without endorsing it). One version of the same argument is present in 
Carl Schmitt’s formula “Humanity, Bestiality.” As Schmitt writes, “[t]he concept of humanity is 
an especially useful ideological instrument.” CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 
54 (George Schwab trans., 2007). For a discussion of Schmitt’s critique of Kant’s conception in 
Perpetual Peace, see Jürgen Habermas, Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two 
Hundred Years’ Hindsight, in PERPETUAL PEACE: ESSAYS ON KANT’S COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL 132, 
135–36 (James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann eds., 1997). 
 4 See, e.g., THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1998); 
Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between 
Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 258, 258–326 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. 
Trachtman eds., 2009); Alexander Somek, On Cosmopolitan Self-Determination, 1 GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 405 (2012). Beyond the legal context, see DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND 
THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995). 
 5 Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1032 (2007). 
 6 Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 
1673–75 (2003). 
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cosmopolitanism concerns the role and importance of states”7—states, 
in the plural. Kant defends at great length the existence of a plurality of 
states, as opposed to a unitary world government.8 Furthermore, his 
argument refers to specifically legal duties, as opposed to moral or 
political obligations. Kant is adamant that his concern is “not with 
philanthropy, but with right.”9 Far from being sidelined, issues of 
enforcement are central to this account.10 Finally, the intellectual history 
of cosmopolitanism is too complex to dismiss its driving ideal as 
nothing more than an expression of imperialism. While it remains a 
danger that cosmopolitanism will be used to claim universal relevance 
for viewpoints “infected by the particularity of the speaker, the world of 
his or her experience, culture and profession, knowledge and 
ignorance,”11 it is no less true that the reaction to the horrors of 
European colonialism is a part of the very origins of cosmopolitanism.12 
 
 7 PAULINE KLEINGELD, KANT AND COSMOPOLITANISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAL OF 
WORLD CITIZENSHIP 6 (2012). As I discuss in greater detail below, Kant’s reasons for rejecting a 
world state are partly—though not exclusively—practical in nature. Hans Kelsen’s own 
concerns, though similar to Kant’s, are edifying. See HANS KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 5 
(1944) (“There can be no doubt that the ideal solution of the problem of world organization as 
the problem of world peace is the establishment of a World Federal State composed of all or as 
many nations as possible. The realization of this idea, however, is confronted with serious and, 
at least at present, insurmountable difficulties.”). For our present purpose, it is important to 
keep in mind that even when unification remains a distant ideal, the separateness of states as a 
practical matter is severable from the goal of unification. See, e.g., KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, 
COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006); ROBERT FINE, 
COSMOPOLITANISM (2007); Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516 (1994). 
 8 Brian Barry and Charles Beitz have argued that “it may be that the best way to realize the 
ideals of moral cosmopolitanism lies in organizing humanity in a society of states that retain 
their separate statehood while subjecting themselves to the requirements of international 
covenants and some universal principles.” BROWN, supra note 3, at 109 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Brian Barry, Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique, in 
GLOBAL JUSTICE: NOMOS XLI 12, 39 (Ian Shapiro & Lea Brilmayer eds., 1999) (“[C]osmopolitan 
morality does not commit its adherents to any particular institutional arrangement, including a 
world state . . . .”). 
 9 IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 93, 105 (Hans Reiss, ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (emphasis omitted). 
 10 Compare BROWN, supra note 3, at 14 (“[A]ny form of Kantian cosmopolitanism certainly 
has an institutional component.”), with Barry, supra note 8, at 35 (“Cosmopolitanism is a moral 
outlook, not an institutional prescription.”); see also SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, Conceptions of 
Cosmopolitanism, in BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES 111, 129 (2003) (arguing that “moderate 
cosmopolitanism about justice[—which the author advocates—]will be a compelling position 
only if it proves possible to devise human institutions, practices, and ways of life that take 
seriously the equal worth of persons without undermining people’s capacity to sustain their 
special loyalties and attachments”). 
 11 Martti Koskenniemi, The Subjective Dangers of Projects of World Community, in 
REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 3, 10. 
 12 Pauline Kleingeld, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global Order, 2 
KANTIAN REVIEW 72, 75–76 (1998) (arguing that in third definitive article in Perpetual Peace, 
which gives a stranger the right not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone 
else’s territory, Kant was “primarily concerned with limiting the rights of colonialist 
aggressors”); see also 2 ALAN RYAN, ON POLITICS: A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM 
HERODOTUS TO THE PRESENT 859–60 (2012) (describing Kant as a “principled anti-imperialist” 
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Unmarred by some unshakable original sin, cosmopolitanism stands in 
no obvious need of an apology. 
Yet the goal of this Article is not to rehabilitate cosmopolitanism 
for its own sake—it is to put it to work. Contemporary law has been 
much impoverished by the absence of the rich cosmopolitan tradition. 
The partial exception remains international law, where Kant’s Perpetual 
Peace, published in 1795, remains a text of reference.13 The emphasis on 
individuals as “human beings, rather than as citizens of states”14 
resonates with recent developments in supranational human rights 
structures.15 For instance, Alec Stone Sweet’s recent study of European 
legal integration draws specifically on Kant to define a cosmopolitan 
legal order as “a transnational legal system in which all public officials 
bear the obligation to fulfill the fundamental rights of every person 
within their jurisdiction, without respect to nationality or citizenship.”16 
 
and discussing his views about human progress). While Kant might have been a “child of his 
time,” as Habermas called him, his views did not fit the charges leveled against him. See Jürgen 
Habermas, Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance?, in THE 
DIVIDED WEST 113, 147 (Ciaran Cronin ed. & trans., 2004). It is noteworthy to mention in this 
context that one can be a critic of Kant without being a critic of cosmopolitanism. For example, 
James Tully criticized Kant in the name of cosmopolitanism for endorsing views that Tully 
labeled “cultural imperialism.” See James Tully, The Kantian Idea of Europe: Critical and 
Cosmopolitan Perspectives, in THE IDEA OF EUROPE: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 331, 358 (Anthony Pagden ed., 2002). Tully also disputes the application of the adjective 
cosmopolitan to Kant’s political philosophy. It is true that Kant refers to “cosmopolitan right,” 
and not to cosmopolitanism as such. See supra note 9. Other authors refer to a cosmopolitan 
constitutional or legal order. While the distinction could be significant, especially in the field of 
Kantian exegesis, the use of cosmopolitanism has been adopted widely. See, e.g., Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, 5 J. POL. PHIL. 1 (1997). 
 13 Robert Delahunty & John Yoo, Kant, Habermas and Democratic Peace, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
437, 445 (2010) (describing Perpetual Peace as “probably [Kant’s] most widely read and 
influential work on international law and relations”). Not long after its entry into force, Carl 
Friedrich pointed out the Kantian origins of the U.N. Charter. See CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, 
INEVITABLE PEACE 33 (1948) (arguing that the U.N. Charter “in many respects fulfills those 
conditions which Immanuel Kant had formulated as essential for the establishment of a world-
wide organization”); see also ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM, at xi (2009) 
(noting—and discussing critically—a movement in the United States “toward the view that the 
real justification for international law is cosmopolitan”). 
 14 Kleingeld, supra note 12, at 72.  
 15 Id. (concluding that Kant’s Perpetual Peace “illuminates recent changes in the status of 
individuals under international law”). On cosmopolitanism more generally, see Feldman, supra 
note 5, at 1025 (“By treating the individual as primary, and his or her political associations as 
secondary, cosmopolitanism can clear the way to imagining not only moral and ethical but also 
legal duties justifiably arising outside the bounds of state or other political power.”); see also 
SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 16 (Robert Post ed., 2008) (arguing that 
cosmopolitan norms “whatever the conditions of their legal origination, accrue to individuals 
as moral and legal persons in a worldwide civil society. . . . they endow individuals rather than 
states and their agents with certain rights and claims” (emphasis omitted)). Cosmopolitanism is 
sometimes the object of criticism. Jack Goldsmith has discussed critically cosmopolitan duties 
incumbent upon the United States to enter into treaties and to engage in costly humanitarian 
interventions that do not enhance the net U.S. welfare. Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 1669.  
 16 Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights 
Adjudication in Europe, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 53, 53 (2012). While Stone Sweet looks 
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However, there are fields other than public international law or 
European Union law that stand to gain equally, if not more, from a 
cosmopolitan outlook.17 My focus in this Article is on constitutional 
law. In stark contrast with the commonplace view of cosmopolitanism 
as concerned exclusively with the supranational level, cosmopolitanism 
in its Kantian version places great emphasis on domestic 
constitutionalism—the “republican constitution.”18 One scholar has 
gone so far as to claim that, “domestic justice is the cornerstone of 
Kant’s overall cosmopolitan vision.”19 The deep continuity between ius 
civitatis (domestic political right), ius gentium (international political 
right), ius cosmopoliticum (cosmopolitan right), and specifically the 
supranational implications of the constitutional structure of states,20 is 
Kant’s “conceptual innovation”21 and “a plan of great political 
courage.”22 
 
exclusively at the European supranational system, he points out that the Kantian model can be 
applied to global constitutionalism more generally. Id. at 83. However, there are important 
differences between the European and the global contexts, especially because of the very 
different institutional settings. 
 17 This is more a statement about international law than about cosmopolitanism. As Mark 
Mazower recently argued, international law has become a “mere shadow of what they hoped it 
might become, which was a complete alternative mode of conducting relations between states.” 
MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN IDEA, 1815 TO THE 
PRESENT 66 (2012). 
 18 See KANT, supra note 9, at 99 (stating as the first article of perpetual peace that “[t]he 
[c]ivil [c]onstitution of [e]very [s]tate shall be [r]epublican”). 
 19 BROWN, supra note 3, at 45. The author goes on to argue that “the state’s legal apparatus 
and republican government, as understood as a form of popular sovereignty, is given 
considerable priority in providing the foundations for a continued movement toward 
cosmopolitan justice.” Id. at 99; see also JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 8 (1999) (“The 
crucial fact of peace among democracies rests on the internal structure of democratic 
societies . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). It is precisely because of the centrality of domestic 
constitutionalism, or republican constitutions, that the recent attempts to incorporate China 
within the framework of a Kantian-inspired project faced great challenges. See Manik Suri, 
Conceptualizing China Within the Kantian Peace, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219 (2013). 
 20 See KANT, supra note 9, at 137 (arguing that “if even only one of these three possible 
forms of rightful state lacks a principle which limits external freedom by means of laws, the 
structure of all the rest must inevitably be undermined, and finally collapse”). Kant also wrote 
that, “the problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a 
law governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is 
also solved.” BROWN, supra note 3, at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Kant).  
 21 BENHABIB, supra note 15, at 21 (“The conceptual innovation of Kant’s doctrine of 
cosmopolitanism is that Kant recognized three interrelated but distinct levels of ‘right,’ in the 
juridical senses of the term. First is domestic law, the sphere of posited relations of right, which 
Kant claims should be in accordance with a republican constitution; second is the sphere of 
rightful relations among nations . . . resulting from treaty obligations among states; third is 
cosmopolitan right, which concerns relations among civil persons to each other as well as to 
organized political entities in a global civil society.” (footnote omitted)). On the deep continuity 
between national and international law, from a neo-Kantian perspective, see LARS VINX, HANS 
KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW: LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 176 (2007); see also Kumm, supra 
note 4. For a similar argument, as far as the continuity between national and international law 
is concerned, although from different jurisprudential standpoint, see Jack Goldsmith & Daryl 
Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
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This is, I argue, the kind of conceptual innovation needed to make 
sense of transformations in the global constitutional landscape over the 
past few decades. These transformations, which have been referred to as 
“inevitable globalization,”23 or the “new universe,”24 in constitutional 
law, are brought about in large measure by cross-jurisdictional 
exchanges among constitutional systems around the world.25 As Sujit 
Choudhry has argued, “[t]he migration of constitutional ideas across 
legal systems is rapidly emerging as one of the central features of 
contemporary constitutional practice.”26 These synchronous 
developments have impacted domestic constitutionalism and have 
shaped the understanding of political power, the relation between states 
and individuals, and the judicial role. Locked in “methodological 
nationalism,”27 constitutional theory has lacked the intellectual 
framework to theorize these developments. Of this missing framework, 
 
1791 (2009) (arguing that both international and constitutional law are best understood as part 
of public law which, by contrast to ordinary domestic law, are meant as solutions to the same 
problem of constituting and constraining the state). 
 22 OTFRIED HÖFFE, KANT’S COSMOPOLITAN THEORY OF LAW AND PEACE 151 (Alexandra 
Newton trans., 2006) (Kant’s “connection between the republic as a political innovation at the 
time and a truly global perspective, give[s] rise to a plan of great political courage. If humanity 
would recognize it by establishing a legal order according to moral principles not only within 
states, but also between them, then it would, as a whole, attain the status of kingliness.”). 
 23 Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 985 
(2009). 
 24 VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (4th ed. 
2009). Some of the issues brought up by globalization are old but taking a new cast. One 
particularly relevant example is the extraterritoriality of constitutional norms. See generally KAL 
RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF 
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009); see also, Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to Justice 
Stephen G. Breyer (Apr. 29, 2005), reproduced in Lawrence H. Tride, The Treatise Power, 8 
GREEN BAG 2D 291, 292, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Tribe-
Treatise-Green%20Bag%202005%20low%20res.pdf (mentioning dispute regarding “the proper 
role and likely impact of treaty, international and foreign law” among the reasons for the 
suspension of the third edition of the author’s much-celebrated American Constitutional Law 
Treatise). 
 25 There are also other mechanisms through which constitutional law is being transformed. 
For instance, a recent study has thoroughly documented the subtle and indirect ways in which 
international human rights treaties lead the constitutional convergence. See Zachary Elkins, 
Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional 
Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 61 (2013). 
 26 Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in 
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 13 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). I discuss this 
phenomenon at greater length in Vlad Perju, Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing and 
Migration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304, 1304–
27 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). For a more recent discussion in the context of 
global intellectual history, see Samuel Moyn, On the Nonglobalization of Ideas, in GLOBAL 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 187–204 (Samuel Moyn & Andrew Sartori eds., 2013). 
 27 GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
GLOBALIZATION 10 (2012). There are, of course, notable exceptions. See, e.g., Mattias Kumm, 
Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement, in THE 
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, supra note 26, at 256; Grainne de Búrca & Oliver 
Gerstenberg, The Denationalization of Constitutional Law, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 243 (2006). 
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Robert Post prophesied at the turn of the millennium:  
All forms of American constitutional law scholarship . . . have been 
firmly anchored within the secure frame of a national legal system 
grounded in a democratic state. . . . [T]he single greatest challenge to 
these disciplines will come from circumstances that negate the 
generic and implicit presupposition of this scholarship, which is the 
frame of a national legal system within a democratic state.28 
I do not mean to suggest that Kant’s conception of 
cosmopolitanism, tel quel,29 is the much-needed framework. That 
conception needs to be “reformulated” using “the superior and 
undeserved knowledge of later generations” to resolve its “conceptual 
difficulties.”30 Kant did not quite anticipate the type of developments 
currently underway in constitutional law.31 He theorized “republican 
constitutions”—or constitutional democracies, in today’s parlance—
independently of one another, and while he recognized the deep 
normative continuity within public right, he nevertheless kept its 
different dimensions separate. Downplaying cross-jurisdictional 
interdependence and, generally, a degree of inattention to how domestic 
jurisdictions interact outside shared institutional frameworks, are blind 
spots of Perpetual Peace. The question, however, is if Kant’s 
philosophical account has the resources to help us make sense of these 
phenomena. The answer to that question is affirmative. His account of a 
multilayered public law, which includes municipal, international, and 
cosmopolitan levels, is particularly relevant. Furthermore, and 
depending on one’s interpretation, Kant’s account of cosmopolitan 
hospitality sets the normative grounds for all trans-jurisdictional 
 
 28 Robert Post, The Challenge of Globalization to American Public Law Scholarship, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 327 (2001). Post has also argued that, “[a] fundamental 
challenge for our time is the construction of a jurisprudential theory able to reconcile the 
universality of human rights with the partiality of positive law.” Robert Post, Introduction to 
SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 15, at 1, 3.  
 29 As the reader has already noticed, that framework is different from the framework of 
cosmopolitan right. In Kant’s account, “cosmopolitan right” has a very clearly delimited 
meaning. See infra Part III.C. On the other hand, I refer to the framework of cosmopolitanism 
as the entirety of the account of public right that Kant articulated in Perpetual Peace. 
 30 Habermas, supra note 3, at 114. Many of the elements that Habermas discusses in this 
chapter—such as the international structure or the interpretation of international peace—fall 
beyond the interest of this Article, which is what I call the missing step of the direct interaction 
between republican constitutions, and its impact on the domestic constitutionalism of each. 
 31 KATRIN FLIKSCHUH, KANT AND MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 187 (2000) (arguing 
that “Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan Right requires some extension under current 
conditions of globalization” (emphasis omitted)); see also BROWN, supra note 3, at 39 
(“Although Kant never used the term globalization specifically, he did believe that the world 
was becoming increasingly interconnected and that the forces of nature were organized in such 
a way that it would eventually produce a cosmopolitan condition.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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interactions, including among constitutional systems.32 Other elements 
of Kant’s philosophical account—such as the choice for an international 
federation of very limited powers—might even require or presuppose 
the kind of rich interplay between republican constitutions. His 
“brilliant anticipation of a global public sphere,”33 to use Habermas’s 
formulation, makes it particularly helpful for understanding the global 
transformation of constitutional law.  
The timing of the turn to Kant should be unsurprising. After a long 
period in which Kant’s political philosophy was considered far less 
advanced than his moral philosophy, there has been an “astonishing 
revival”34 of interest in his political philosophy over the past two 
decades. The revival has left traces in legal thought, especially in 
contract, tort, and criminal law as well as in general jurisprudence.35 But 
its radiating effect has not yet reached constitutional law, for reasons not 
obvious given that “Kant’s influence has been greatest in shaping the 
doctrine of the Rechtsstaat, the state governed according to the rule of 
law.”36 Perhaps more surprisingly, his influence remains similarly 
limited in the nascent fields of comparative constitutional law and 
global constitutionalism. Three recent, field-formative encyclopedias of 
comparative constitutional law make virtually no mention of 
cosmopolitanism or Kant in their comprehensive surveys of these 
fields.37 
It might seem facetious to be surprised at this absence. After all, 
isn’t the reason for this absence obvious—constitutional law? How can 
 
 32 Compare Jeremy Waldron, Cosmopolitan Norms, in ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra 
note 15, at 83, with SEYLA BENHABIB, Hospitality, Sovereignty and Democratic Iterations, in 
ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM, supra note 15, at 147. 
 33 Habermas, supra note 3, at 124; see also James Bohman, The Public Spheres of the World 
Citizen, in PERPETUAL PEACE: ESSAYS ON KANT’S COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL, supra note 3, at 179–
200. 
 34 FLIKSCHUH, supra note 31, at 182. Flikschuh traces the revival to widely influential works 
by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. See RAWLS, supra note 19; Habermas, supra note 12, 
 35 Its influence is felt in other fields, such as contract, tort, or criminal law, but its influence 
has not until now penetrated the field of constitutional law. See, e.g., George Fletcher, Why 
Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421 (1987); Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System 
of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795 (2002). For a more general jurisprudential discussion, 
see ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
(2009); Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535 (1996). Noah 
Feldman’s important article, Cosmopolitan Law?, focuses on both more ancient and more 
recent works on cosmopolitanism and does not discuss Kant’s work. See Feldman, supra note 5, 
at 1022. The analysis, however, is relevant to a study of Kant, given Kant’s reliance on Stoic 
cosmopolitanism. See Martha Nussbaum, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, in PERPETUAL PEACE: 
ESSAYS ON KANT’S COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL, supra note 3, at 25–57. 
 36 Hans Reiss, Introduction to IMMANUAL KANT, KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 9, 
at 1, 11. 
 37  COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011); 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner & Cheryl 
Saunders eds., 2013); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra 
note 26. 
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the cosmopolitan ideal find a home in constitutional law, premised as it 
is on the particularity of different jurisdictions? How does 
cosmopolitanism fit with a democracy’s commitment to self-
government?38 Is not “cosmopolitan action by a liberal 
democracy . . . bounded by constituent preferences,”39 as Jack 
Goldsmith put it, rather than the other way around? Whatever sway 
cosmopolitanism might have over international human rights or, 
generally, “suprapositive law,”40 isn’t constitutional law necessarily 
bound up to the particular political community? 
I discuss these challenges in the last part of this Article where I 
group them into the challenge of democracy, the challenge of history 
and the challenge of politics. Part I introduces Kant’s account of 
republican constitutions, with a particular focus on its structural 
institutional and normative features. Part II discusses the global 
transformation of constitutional law. It explores how the Kantian 
theoretical framework can help us understand these developments as 
well as what these developments add to Kant’s own framework. What is 
the relation between the theory and the practice of republican 
constitutional orders? Why do constitutional democracies interact with 
one another and how, if at all, does their interaction shape each system’s 
capacity for responsiveness to the demands of their subjects? What does 
it mean to say that constitutional systems are converging, and, assuming 
that they are, can the framework of cosmopolitanism help us 
understand what they are converging toward? Does the idea of 
perpetual peace offer a compelling answer? After discussing these 
questions in the domestic context, I turn in Part III to the international 
level and specifically to Kant’s rejection of a world state in favor of an 
international federation. I then discuss in Part IV whether cosmopolitan 
hospitality, which Kant discusses as the third definitive article in 
Perpetual Peace, is a convincing framework for theorizing cross-
constitutional interactions.  
Throughout the analysis, I offer a view of cosmopolitanism from-
the-ground-up. Domestic jurisdictions have a preferential standpoint. 
My account is different from other cosmopolitan conceptions that 
proceed from the top-down by theorizing the constitutionalization of 
 
 38 Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 1669 (“Constitutional and collective action hurdles, and 
other difficulties, constrain cosmopolitan action . . . . Cosmopolitan argument must be bounded 
by institutional and moral constraints that arise in the domestic-democratic sphere. We cannot 
even have a coherent ideal of liberal democracies’ cosmopolitan duties unless we understand 
these realistic limits on what liberal democracies can do.”). 
 39 Id. at 1686. 
 40 Gerard L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 1863 (2003). 
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international law and institutions,41 with arguments about the creation 
of a world parliament, strengthening the world court and reforming the 
United Nations.42 Such top-down conceptions have a difficult time 
accounting for the existence of a plurality of municipal systems as well 
as for the theoretical building blocks—state, sovereignty, solidarity—
that underpin that reality. These difficulties are particularly stringent in 
the case of specifically constitutional accounts that take the existence of 
jurisdictional boundaries as a given. However, my approach also differs 
from more traditional constitutionalist accounts, which show a fleeting 
interest in other constitutional systems but remain firmly grounded in 
one given constitutional order. In fact, many of the most important 
transformations take place within public law, in the legal spaces that 
open up between and within republican constitutions. In the following 
pages I argue for a bottom-up cosmopolitan framework, which accounts 
for the supranational constitutional phenomena without subsuming 
municipal constitutional orders or otherwise compromising their 
integrity.  
I.     IUS CIVITATIS: REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONS 
Kant divides the path to Perpetual Peace into three “definitive 
articles,” from which states may not derogate, and a set of six 
preliminary articles.43 The three definitive articles are: “The Civil 
Constitutions of Every State shall be Republican” (the first definitive 
article); “The Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free 
States” (the second definitive article); and, finally, “Cosmopolitan Right 
shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality” (the third 
definitive article).44 These definitive articles roughly correspond to the 
domestic, the international, and the cosmopolitan right (or 
cosmopolitanism strict sensu) dimensions. This Section takes up the 
 
 41 See, e.g., Habermas, supra note 12; Kumm, supra note 4. For context to these works, and 
specifically to the argument that justice at the supranational level depends on the existence of 
global institutions, see Liam Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 251 (1999); Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (2005). 
 42 See Habermas, supra note 3, at 134–36.  
 43 The preliminary articles, which I discuss in this Article only when relevant to the analysis 
of the definitive articles, require that no secret reservations be made that would allow for a 
future war, that no independent state be acquired by another state, that standing armies be 
abolished, that no national debt be contracted in connection with the affairs of the state, that no 
state forcibly interfere in the constitution or government of another state, and that no state 
engage in acts of hostility that would endanger mutual confidence at the time of peace. See 
KANT, supra note 9, at 93–96.  
 44 BROWN, supra note 3, at 95 (arguing that the three definitive articles conform to 
contractarian criteria). Brown goes on to point out that the three “definitive articles correspond 
to the categorical imperative and represents an attempt to create a rightful condition of 
universal law without the need for an overarching world government.” Id. at 95. 
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observation that perpetual peace among states requires, first of all, a set 
of institutional principles and institutional structures that are internal to 
each of these states. Kant refers to that structure as the republican 
constitution.45 The structure is of central importance since a “republican 
constitution is the only one which does complete justice to the rights of 
man.”46 
The starting point for understanding the first definitive principle is 
a distinction between republican and democratic constitutions. The 
salient feature of a democracy is the fact that the people, as holders of 
the seat of sovereignty, exercise their rights as sovereigns directly. By 
contrast, republicanism, in which Kant saw the alternative to tyranny, is 
the form of government in which the legislative and the executive are 
separated.47 At first glance, Kant seems to have in mind the familiar 
principle of the separation of powers.48 But however important the 
separation of powers may be, can it truly be counted as the only obstacle 
in a state’s path to tyranny? 
 A closer reading shows that his emphasis on separating the 
executive from the legislative has more to do with the importance of 
representative government—the only “mode of government is to accord 
with the concept of right”49—rather than with the separation of powers 
as such.50 A state in which the executive is different from the legislative, 
and citizens are self-governing, is one in which the authority to exercise 
the sovereign power is in the hands of another institution (the 
 
 45 KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 48 (“Kant’s republican notion of the state may well explain 
his change of view regarding the way peace should be pursued.”). The prominence of the 
internal structure of the state is somewhat lost when the emphasis becomes exclusively on 
international law. Hans Kelsen writes that “the problem of a durable peace can be sought only 
within the framework of international law—that is to say, by an organization which, in the 
degree of its centralization, does not exceed that of the usual type of international 
communities.” KELSEN, supra note 7, at 12.  
 46 KANT, supra note 9, at 112 (emphasis omitted); see also BROWN, supra note 3, at 95. For 
Kant, “republicanism” does not mean a polity centered on an idea of a good life, such as one 
finds in later theories of republicanism. See, e.g., NORBERTO BOBBIO & MAURIZIO VIROLI, THE 
IDEA OF THE REPUBLIC (Allan Cameron trans., 2003). 
 47 In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant discussed how the three separated powers—the 
ruling power in the person of the legislator, the executive power, and the judicial power—are 
the parts of the universally united will. KANT, supra note 9, at 138–43. 
 48 In this sense too, Kant was the philosopher of the French Revolution. Article 16 of the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) stipulates that “Any society in 
which the guarantee of the rights is not secured, or the separation of powers not settled has no 
constitution.” Déclaration Universelle des Droits de L’Homme et du Citoyen [Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the Citizen] art. 16 (1789) (Fr.). The principle of the separation of 
powers requires interpretation. But see RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 211 (1999) 
(describing Kant’s approach as “far from being like a Montesquieuian or Madisonian 
separation of powers”). 
 49 KANT, supra note 9, at 102. 
 50 See also Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
433 (2013). 
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executive) that, in republican systems, exercises power as a 
representative of the sovereign legislator. For this reason, Kant thought 
democracy to be necessarily despotic because the will of the sovereign 
(the people) can govern without the need to be represented by powers 
separated into executive and legislative.51 For contemporary societies, by 
contrast, the phrase constitutional democracy might be fraught with 
tensions,52 but it is neither a tautology nor a pleonasm. Unlike for Kant, 
who could not simply assume representation of the sovereign in the 
process of implementing its will, the scale of contemporary democracies 
prevents direct democracy, that is, democracy unmediated by 
institutions of representation, from being a viable option. In modern 
politics, constitutionalist features of republicanism have become 
internalized and are now assumed when referring to constitutionalism 
tout court. As Otfried Höffe concludes, “Kant links unqualified or 
eternal peace to the principle of modern politics, namely, a democracy 
committed to human rights and to the division of power, at his time 
referred to as a republic.”53 
I will take up later the important question whether Kant’s 
identification of the features of republican constitutions is sufficiently 
general and loose to avoid the risk of constitutional uniformity. For 
now, let us note that each republican constitution instills a set of 
principles: freedom for all members of society (as human beings); 
formal equality for everyone (as citizens); and dependence of everyone 
upon a single common legislation (as subjects). Civil constitutions 
create the external conditions for freedom by making coercion the 
subject of laws rather than of the arbitrary will of another human 
being.54 As Kant had argued in the Metaphysics of Morals, the sum total 
of the conditions for the reconciliation between the wills of different 
persons in accordance with the universal law of freedom is defined as 
the concept of right.55 
On this basis Kant distinguishes “patriotic” from a “paternal” 
government. In the former regime: 
Each regards himself as authorised to protect the rights of the 
commonwealth by laws of the general will, but not to submit it to his 
personal use at his own absolute pleasure. This right of freedom 
 
 51 KANT, supra note 9, at 101; see also TUCK, supra note 48, at 211 (on the nature of 
representation in Kant). 
 52 See Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of 
Constitutional Democracy and the Project of Political Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
372, 374 (2012). 
 53 HÖFFE, supra note 22, at 15.  
 54 KANT, supra note 9, at 99 (“My external and rightful freedom should be defined as a 
warrant to obey no external law except those to which I have been able to give my own 
consent.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 55 KANT, supra note 9, at 133. 
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belongs to each member of the commonwealth as a human being, in 
so far as each is a being capable of possessing rights.56 
This is the conception of freedom on which contemporary 
constitutional democracies are grounded. Closely related to this 
conception, although not as widely shared, is Kant’s conception of 
formal equality.57 Human beings are equals as subjects of the state since 
they are equal subjects before the law.58 However, Kant points out that 
this formal equality is “perfectly consistent with the utmost inequality of 
the mass in the degree of its possessions.”59 
Self-government follows from the idea of freedom defined as the 
absence of any restraints that are not self-imposed. As Kant put it, “my 
external and rightful freedom should be defined as a warrant to obey no 
external laws except those to which I have been able to give my own 
consent.”60 This is the familiar idea, embedded in the normative 
presuppositions of all constitutional democracies, of the citizen as “co-
legislator”—“[f]or only towards oneself can one never act unjustly.”61 
Self-government explains why only a republican constitution leads to 
perpetual peace. Only under a system of self-government would the 
citizens be consulted on the decision to go to war, and, Kant believes, 
they would vote against “calling down on themselves all the miseries of 
war.”62  
Kant’s description of the salient features of republican 
constitutions matches the features of constitutional democracies. As 
 
 56 KANT, supra note 9, at 74. As Arthur Ripstein puts it, “republican governments do not 
act for private purposes.” RIPSTEIN, supra note 35, at 229.  
 57 However, Kant points out that this formal equality is “perfectly consistent with the 
utmost inequality of the mass in the degree of its possessions.” KANT, supra note 9, at 75. For a 
discussion of Kant’s conception of redistribution and equality of opportunity, see RIPSTEIN, 
supra note 35, at 267–99. 
 58 Hence the conclusion that: 
[E]very member of the commonwealth must be entitled to reach any degree of rank 
which a subject can earn through his talent, his industry and his good fortune. And 
his fellow-subjects may not stand in his way by hereditary prerogatives or privileges 
of rank and thereby hold him and his descendants back indefinitely. . . . Since birth is 
not an act on the part of the one who is born, it cannot create any inequality in his 
legal position . . . . 
KANT, supra note 9, at 75–76. For this reason, Kant has been called “the philosopher of the 
French Revolution.” See Reiss, supra note 36, at 3.  
 59 KANT, supra note 9, at 75.  
 60 Id. at 99 (emphasis omitted). 
 61 Id. at 77; see also Reiss, supra note 36, at 30 (“The fundamental element of any republican 
constitution . . . is respect for law. The subjects as well as the ruler and the sovereign must 
possess this respect. In the last resort, the subject can be expected to respect those laws in the 
giving of which he has participated as fellow-legislator.”). 
 62 KANT, supra note 9, at 100. To be sure, this account is not beyond objection. One of the 
devastating effects of nationalism in the nineteenth century turned out to be the propensity of 
states, including those based on republican constitutional orders, to wage wars. For a critique 
along these lines, see Habermas, supra note 3, at 120. For a discussion, see infra Part III.A.  
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Brian Barry has argued, “within a state, cosmopolitanism of (Kantian) 
form is commonly called liberalism by political philosophers.”63 It is 
worth pointing out that attachment to a republican constitution 
explains Kant’s view of patriotism as a cosmopolitan duty.64 In societies 
ruled on the basis of republican constitutions—that is, in constitutional 
democracies65—citizens have duties different from those of the subjects 
in a non-republican state. Since only a republican state has the structure 
of institutions and procedures that make collective self-government—
and freedom—possible, such a state requires an attitude of civic 
commitment on the part of the citizenry.66 
Thus far we have considered the republican constitutional orders 
in isolation. But once they come into existence,67 these orders become 
part of a world of political communities that are similarly structured 
and normatively oriented. Under external conditions that enable 
communication and exchanges among systems—from the existence of 
technology to the education of elites—the constitutional republics 
establish relations that do not depend upon pre-existing institutional 
frameworks and are, until proven differently, voluntary in nature.68 
How do these orders relate to one another? How does their interaction 
alter their internal constitutional processes? While constitutional 
challenges and problems will not be identical, given the contingencies of 
their particular historical situations, neither are they likely to be 
unrecognizably different. From a constitutional standpoint, all legal 
systems will have to interpret their common (republican) principles, 
structure institutions and (re)calibrate them to the realities of political 
and social life. These constitutional issues are internal to each 
 
 63 Barry, supra note 8, at 36.  
 64 KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 6. Brian Barry refers to the same time of patriotism as “civic 
nationalism.” Barry, supra note 8, at 54. John Rawls refers to it as “proper patriotism.” RAWLS, 
supra note 19. 
 65 BROWN, supra note 3, at 96 (“Kant’s discussions of republicanism come considerably 
close to contemporary understandings of liberal democracy and representative government. As 
has been suggested by many scholars, Kant’s conception of republicanism is closely 
synonymous with current understandings of representative democracies, and it is from this 
resemblance that their interchange has been deemed warranted.”). 
 66 KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 30–31; see also SCHEFFLER, supra note 10, at 129 (arguing 
that “moderate cosmopolitanism about justice,” which the author advocates, “will be a 
compelling position only if it proves possible to devise human institutions, practices, and ways 
of life that take seriously the equal worth of persons without undermining people’s capacity to 
sustain their special loyalties and attachments”); Arthur Applbaum, Legitimacy without a Duty 
to Obey, 38 PHI. & PUB. AFF. 215 (2010); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 
(1988).  
 67 In infra Part II.B., I take up the theoretical and practical question of their existence. 
 68 Regarding the voluntariness, I do not mean to suggest that these relations somehow 
escape the logic of soft power altogether. But I do mean to suggest that these relations are not 
coercive, or they do not amount to a kind of “forcibl[e] interfere[nce] in the constitution and 
government of another state” of the kind that Kant bans in one of the preliminary articles in 
Perpetual Peace. See KANT, supra note 9, at 96 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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jurisdiction but, unless these jurisdictions are hermetically sealed, the 
issues are similar in a non-trivial way. The constitutional interaction can 
be normatively relevant by setting in motion, or contributing to, 
reflection within domestic constitutionalism, including on issues such as 
interpretation of the principles of freedom, equality, and self-
government within each of the municipal jurisdictions. How, then, does 
Kant’s account theorize the interaction and gauge its impact on the 
several constitutional orders? 
The simple answer is that Kant did not anticipate this 
phenomenon. By this I do not mean that he did not anticipate the exact 
historical moment or forms that this phenomenon would take, which of 
course would have been beyond anyone’s powers. Rather, his account 
does not theorize the normative implications of an interchange between 
republican constitutional orders. As we will see, these acts of laterally-
conducted normative integration are neither circumstantial nor shallow. 
Since their effect can be transformative, the question where they fit 
within the structure of public law is important. Kant, however, 
approaches the internal structural and substantive elements of a 
republican constitution within an exclusively domestic framework, 
assuming that republican states are to remain isolated, presumably until 
they enter an international federation. While their stability depends on 
what Kant calls a “cosmopolitan system of general political security,”69 
the substance and development of domestic constitutionalism remain 
confined to that jurisdiction. From this perspective, the constitutional 
account in Perpetual Peace is somewhat static. Yet, at the same time, 
Perpetual Peace offers a structure for theorizing the interplay of 
constitutional orders. As Jeremy Waldron has argued, cosmopolitan 
hospitality in the third definitive article is best understood as a principle, 
rather than a rule, and as such it can carry its normative weight, in this 
case the value of interaction of cultures, beyond its original context.70 
Relatedly, Kant theorized a global public sphere, and his insistence on 
publicity as well as on removing any restrictions on communication are 
enabling factors in the establishment of an international civil society.71 
Such a global “public use of one’s reason in all matters”72 creates the 
conditions of impartiality and objectivity that are necessary in order to 
juridify these spaces.73 As we will see, Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan 
 
 69 KANT, supra note 9, at 49. In the same text, Kant argues that “[t]he problem of 
establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external 
relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved.” Id. at 47 
(emphasis omitted). 
 70 See Waldron, supra note 32, at 88.  
 71 See, e.g., Bohman, supra note 33, at 179–200; see also Habermas, supra note 3, at 123–26. 
 72 KANT, supra note 9, at 55 (emphasis omitted). 
 73 On the criterion of impartiality and the plurality of standpoints, see HANNAH ARENDT, 
LECTURES ON KANT’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 42–46 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1989). I discuss this at 
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right, in its broader interpretation,74 is linked to the global public 
sphere. Finally, there is the issue of the learning processes in republican 
orders. Before putting these pieces together, we need to turn first to a 
brief analysis of the global transformation of constitutional law.  
II.     THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
I have mentioned above the interaction among republican 
constitutional orders. But what exactly does that interaction entail and 
how does it come about? What domestic effect—institutional, 
reputational, and normative—does the circulation of constitutional 
ideas across borders have? What factors drive republican constitutions 
to interact with one another? Should cross-constitutional interactions be 
understood as a dimension of public right that Kant theorizes (ius 
civitas, ius gentium, or ius cosmopoliticum) or, rather, are they best 
understood as another, as-yet-unexplored form of public right? 
A.     Integration of Constitutional Spaces 
American constitutional scholarship has vigorously debated the 
legitimacy of using foreign law for the purpose of constitutional 
interpretation.75 Whatever one’s views on the legitimacy of that practice, 
it is worth noting that its very existence, outside of the framework of 
international institutions, is the signal of a rapprochement of 
constitutional systems. Its timing is largely a matter of historical 
contingency. The story has been told often and it includes standard 
references to the American idea of the constitution as law, the 
mechanics of judicial review in Europe after the First World War, the 
constitutional moments of the aftermath of the Second World War, 
including the enactment of new constitutions, the gradual spread of 
constitutionalism in the following decades, and the constitutional 
 
some length in Vlad Perju, Proportionality and Freedom: An Essay on Method in Constitutional 
Law, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 334 (2012); see also Bohman, supra note 33, at 185–86.  
 74 Kleingeld, supra note 12, at 75 (arguing that cosmopolitan law as concerned with “with 
interaction across borders. . . . covers any kind of communication, interaction, trade, or 
business. It applies to travel, migration, intellectual exchange, as well as to commercial 
endeavors” (citation omitted)). 
 75 The paradigmatic example is the debate about the use of foreign law for the purpose of 
constitutional interpretation. For a comprehensive description of this phenomenon, see 
APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW (Carlos Esplugues, Jose Luis Iglesias & Guillermo Palao eds., 
2011). For analysis, see JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”: 
FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS (2012); Vlad Perju, The Puzzling Parameters of the 
Foreign Law Debate, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 167 (2007); Eric Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of 
Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006); Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. 
L. REV. 1931 (2008). 
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effervescence following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and of 
apartheid in South Africa at the end of the century. For our purposes, it 
suffices to point out that written constitutions now structure and 
discipline the exercise of political power across legal systems. Bills of 
rights adorn these constitutional charters, and independent courts 
around the world have been entrusted with their enforcement.76 “[T]he 
most successful legal transplant in the second half of the twentieth 
century”77 is not an element of contract or property law, as jurists of 
comparative law would have predicted,78 but rather it is a method of 
constitutional interpretation.79 The ensuing constitutional migrations 
have not only changed the world’s constitutional landscape but have 
also profoundly altered the approach to domestic constitutionalism. To 
some extent, actors in these systems—judges, lawyers, claimants—end 
up inhabiting shared constitutional spaces. 
A helpful account of these integrated spaces, or lifeworlds,80 comes 
from Lorraine Weinrib. In her reconstruction of the specifically 
“sophisticated judicial paradigm,” these developments are said to have 
“produced a particular conception of constitutional ordering, to 
stabilize democracy and safeguard equal citizenship and respect for 
inherent human dignity as supreme or higher law.”81 This is the 
globalization of the “rights-based [constitutional] conception.”82 The 
constitutional paradigm rests on principled ways to dovetail competing 
imperatives that have produced tensions in legal thought. This post-war 
judicial paradigm provides “a safe haven from both popular sovereignty, 
history and tradition, on the one hand, and judicial subjectivity, on the 
 
 76 Even in France, where opposition to the “government des juges” meant that citizens could 
not ask the Constitutional Council, that jurisdiction’s constitutional court, to strike down 
legislation as unconstitutional, reforms have recently been introduced that change this state of 
affairs. For an earlier account of constitutional development in France, see ALEC SWEET, THE 
BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (1992). 
 77 Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of 
Constitutional Justice, 2 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 574, 595 (2003). 
 78 See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW (1974); Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 
(1974). 
 79 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 74, 160 (2008) (arguing that proportionality 
has become “a foundational element of global constitutionalism”). For proportionality more 
generally, see AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS 211–40 (Doron Kalir trans., 2012); Perju, supra note 73, at 334–67.  
 80 For the concept of “lifeworld,” also used in the plural as “lifeworlds,” see JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWOLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE 
OF FUNCTIONALIST REASONING (Thomas McCarthy trans., 3d ed. 1985). 
 81 Loraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in THE 
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, supra note 26, at 84, 86.  
 82 Id. at 85. 
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other.”83 The objective order of constitutional values, which has been 
theorized in German constitutional jurisprudence,84 underpins the legal 
principles at the foundations of liberal democracy and gives legal 
expression to the rights of individuals. While centered on the judiciary, 
this account is comprehensive, since it incorporates a new 
understanding of the state and political power, as well as a conception of 
rights, institutions—including prominently, courts—practices such as 
judicial review, methods, and, generally, a new approach to the relation 
between individuals and the state, and to political power. 
According to Weinrib, the rights-based conception is the outcome 
of several jurisprudential choices. Flexible principles, rather than all-or-
nothing legal rules, “inform” judges’ analysis and the scope of rights-
claims, but “do not function as concrete rules that mechanically dictate 
uniform results.” The method of proportionality is used to assess the 
legality of government action and it does so by integrating contextual 
analysis within legal doctrine in a structured, and principled, manner. 
“Calculations of social utility do not enter into the analysis.”85 Courts 
are the “special guardians of foundational constitutional principles, 
including the rule of law, the separation of powers, the democratic 
function, and the specific rights that the constitution guarantees,” but, 
despite this broad mandate, they do not “encroach upon political 
prerogatives, but restrain[] . . . [their] elected bodies to their electoral 
mandate,” whose limits are set in the constitution.86 In contrast to an 
adversarial model, in which rights are “trump cards” against state 
power, in this collaborative approach, the state and the right-holder are 
understood as working together. As Dieter Grimm, a former Justice of 
the German Constitutional Court puts it, “[t]he function of 
constitutional guarantees of rights is not to make limitations as difficult 
as possible but to require special justifications for limitations that make 
them compatible with the general principles of individual autonomy 
and dignity.”87 In this system, where the three separated powers 
“operate co-operatively,”88 commentators point to a high degree of 
centralization of regulatory authority in national governments and even 
federal systems.89 To sum up the ethos of this constitutional order, the 
“state’s primary aspiration is to create stable institutions that work co-
 
 83 Id. at 88. 
 84 DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 57–58 (3d ed. 2012). 
 85 Weinrib, supra note 26, at 91, 97. 
 86 Id. at 92. 
 87 See Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 384, 391 (2007). 
 88 Weinrib, supra note 26, at 92. 
 89 Tushnet adds “a reasonably high degree of centralization of regulatory authority in 
national governments” and even federal systems. Tushnet, supra note 23, at 985–86.  
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operatively to advance the widest application of the various 
constitutional principles.”90 
This “rights-based (constitutional) conception” is a helpful 
normative reconstruction of a set of complex constitutional practices. 
However, one should be neither too celebratory nor overly gloomy 
about the transformations it depicts. Capturing not quite a “Victorian 
moment,”91 the new model cannot avoid persistent tensions in 
contemporary constitutional thought. From the objective order of 
constitutional values to the non-instrumental nature of its method of 
rights interpretation, and from the nonconflictual relation between the 
state and individuals to the spirit of cooperation among the separated 
powers, deep theoretical disagreements persist about the demands of 
constitutional legitimacy and the tools of constitutional law.92 Pluralism 
and deep disagreement remain salient features of the constitutional 
republics, as Kant and his followers understood and anticipated,93 and 
constitutional law remains a territory in which the larger conflict of 
visions in society unfolds. 
Unless such disagreements are acknowledged, it will be impossible 
to grasp both the important challenges to cross-constitutional 
interactions and the difficulty of theorizing these phenomena. Taking 
domestic constitutionalism as the point of reference, critics have 
challenged the legitimacy of integrating constitutional spaces. Unlike in 
other areas of law, such as antitrust,94 where borrowing and 
transplantation represent a major mechanism of legal development,95 
constitutional law is presumably self-referential since it codifies a 
political community’s charter of self-government.96 The debate about 
the impermissible use of foreign law at the interpretative stage—albeit 
not with respect to constitutional design, for “[n]o one begins writing a 
constitution from scratch,”97—reflects a standard legitimacy challenge.98 
 
 90 Weinrib, supra note 26, at 98. 
 91 I use this phrase in the sense discussed in Martti Koskeniemmi, Lauterpacht: The 
Victorian Tradition in International Law, 2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 215 (1997). 
 92 For more, see infra Part IV.C. 
 93 See Waldron, supra note 35; see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996).  
 94 See, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2011); Eleanor Fox, Antitrust Without Borders: From Roots to Codes to 
Networks, in COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 265 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 
2011).  
 95 WATSON, supra note 78; see also Perju, supra note 26, at 1304.  
 96 Sometimes, constitutions permit the use of “exogenous” materials such as foreign law. 
See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 1, § 1(c), ch. 2, § 39(1)(c) (“When interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum . . . may consider foreign law.”). 
 97 Wiktor Osiatynski, Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 244, 244 
(2003). One can go even further back and identify the global migration of the American 
Declaration of Independence of 1776. For a study, see DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2007). 
 98 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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The rights model also requires empirical qualifications. First, its 
thick description includes features that not all constitutional republics 
share. American constitutional law arguably takes exception with some 
of the features described above, such as a constitution-mandated 
collaborative approach to the separation of powers or the use of 
proportionality in assessing the constitutionality of government action. 
These “exceptionalist” features do not make the American constitution 
un-republican.99 Second, there is a sliding scale between democratic and 
non-democratic regimes. While the rights-based conception model does 
not claim universal reach, the growing number of authoritarian legal 
systems in the world shows its descriptive limits.100 Interestingly, this 
authoritarian turn is not limited to isolated jurisdictions without a 
democratic pedigree. Even among an association of democracies like the 
European Union, authoritarian constitutional developments in 
countries such as Hungary and Romania have unfolded with little 
resistance.101 Finally, this model glosses over constitutional 
dissimilarities among the democratic systems. Dissimilarities are the 
most manifest with respect to the form of government—presidential, 
parliamentary, or mixed—but they extend to the system of 
constitutional review, the mechanism for judicial appointments, and the 
relation between domestic and international law. 
This last point deserves special emphasis. There are countless 
similarities and dissimilarities among constitutional systems. How is 
one to choose what to emphasize and then defend one’s general 
conclusions? In the theory of comparative law, which has a long history 
of thinking through this challenge,102 Rudolf Schlesinger introduced a 
helpful distinction between “integrative” and “contractive” 
comparisons. Contractive comparisons are periods that emphasize 
differences between legal systems, and they alternate with periods of 
integrative comparison, when the focus is on similarities.103 
Schlesinger’s observation was based on his study of private law—
contracts, property, torts—which for him, as for most twentieth century 
comparative lawyers, formed the exclusive domain of proper 
comparative analysis. Yet this pendulum between contraction and 
 
 99 See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2009).  
 100 Rosalind Dixon & Eric Posner, The Limits of Constitutional Convergence, 11 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 399, 415 (2011). 
 101 See Andras Jakab & Pal Sonnevend, Continuity with Deficiencies: The New Basic Law of 
Hungary, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 102 (2013).  
 102 See generally Gerhard Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or 
Differences?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 383–420 (Mathias Reimann & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
 103 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Past and Future of Comparative Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 477 
(1995). 
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integration captures a trait—perhaps also a danger—common to all 
comparative analysis. From this perspective, we live at a time of 
integrative comparisons. This might be true, but merely pointing to this 
feature of our age is by itself insufficient. The need remains for a sound 
criterion to sort out the relevant from the visible, a criterion that must 
be justified through whatever new insight the comparative analysis 
delivers.104 For instance, why are similarities with respect to one given 
set of principles of institutional structure or substantive commitments 
more relevant than alternative sets? Answering these questions requires 
an elaborate theoretical framework that is sufficiently stable to handle 
the constitutional materials and sufficiently flexible to be responsive to 
them. Without such a framework, the most one can hope for is a string 
of disjointed integrative comparisons that only partly document the 
transformation of constitutional law and do not elucidate it. 
The promise of cosmopolitanism in its Kantian version is to offer a 
sound and appealing theoretical framework for understanding the 
complex interplay between the legal systems of constitutional republics. 
Is the goal of perpetual peace a principle of ordering the similarities and 
dissimilarities of constitutional systems as they become visible within 
the framework created by their interactions? Before turning to these 
matters, we must first have a better view of how the integration of 
constitutional spaces comes into existence. 
B.     The Limitations of Constitutional Causality 
What forces push constitutional democracies to become part of an 
integrated constitutional web? Why do republican constitutions interact 
with one another? These “why?” questions have been a prime means for 
elucidating the integration of constitutional spaces.105 
Scholarly accounts of constitutional causality span a wide 
spectrum. According to one way of mapping of this debate,106 at one end 
are exogenous accounts that see constitutional change as 
epiphenomenal and a reflection of deeper forces—economic, 
sociological, political. Sometimes these accounts are referred to as 
bottom-up, to the extent they emphasize the importance of market-
centered processes of cross-jurisdictional competition. David Law, for 
 
 104 Or, as Kant put it, “not all activities are called practice.” IMMANUEL KANT, On The 
Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice”, in KANT: 
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 9, at 61 (emphasis omitted). 
 105 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 
99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1172 (2011) (“To understand why the content of written constitutions 
might exhibit convergence, it is necessary to focus instead upon the range of incentives that 
countries face to adopt similar constitutional provisions.”). 
 106 See Dixon & Posner, supra note 100, at 415. 
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example, has argued that because capital is free to move around, 
attracting it—and thus securing the basis for economic development—
requires that constitutional systems offer investors property rights 
protected by an independent judiciary.107 The cause of constitutional 
convergence, for instance in the globalization of property rights, is thus 
competition among states for investment capital.108 However ingenious, 
this explanation is only partly convincing. In addition to situations 
where competition leads to divergence, rather than convergence,109 
scholars have pointed out elite preferences, namely situations where 
political elites forego constitutional convergence when against their 
interests, as well as differences in the meaning of regulatory takings 
across systems.110 The very dynamic between market interests and 
constitution-making has been challenged by pointing out that the 
market itself is the creation of legal rules.111 Other causal accounts 
emphasize the role of elites operating within professional networks 
whose trading in ideas explains cross-constitutional migration.112 
Capturing the political and economic dimension of this phenomenon, 
Ran Hirschl writes that, “the current global trend toward judicial 
empowerment through constitutionalization is part of a broader process 
whereby self-interested political and economic elites, while they profess 
support for democracy and sustained development, attempt to insulate 
policy-making from the vagaries of democratic politics.”113 
In addition to competition for capital, learning and coercion have 
been identified as endogenous causal accounts of constitutional 
convergence.114 The former sees convergence as the byproduct of a 
process of accumulation of knowledge by relevant legal actors, whereas 
coercion is related to the pressures exerted by an outside force—a 
different constitutional system or even supranational institution—
 
 107 David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1277, 1282 (2008). 
 108 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 558–60 
(1991). 
 109 Dixon & Posner, supra note 100, at 420 (identifying situations when competition leads to 
divergence rather than convergence). 
 110 See Tushnet, supra note 23, at 995–98. 
 111 Id. at 995. 
 112 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); see also Vlad Perju, 
Comparative Constitutionalism and the Making of A New World Order, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 
464 (2005). 
 113 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 217 (2004); see also Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional Borrowing 
and Nonborrowing, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 196, 200 (2003) (“[A]nalyze borrowing—institutional 
choices, really—as a bargaining process among relevant political actors, with their decisions 
reflecting their relative influence, preferences, and beliefs at the moment when the new 
institution is introduced, along with (and critically so) their level of uncertainty about future 
political circumstances.”). But see David Erdos, Aversive Constitutionalism in the Westminster 
World: The Genesis of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990), 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 343 (2003). 
 114 Dixon & Posner, supra note 100, at 399. 
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regarding the adoption of a particular constitutional rule or institution. 
Both of these accounts add important insights to the globalization of 
constitutional law but are ultimately wanting. Learning is insufficient 
because, however beneficial greater knowledge might be, having such 
knowledge is an insufficient ground to establish legal authority. The 
pedigree of a source of knowledge is an essential component to the law-
ness of a norm. That is why justifications of the use of foreign law as 
opportunities for learning cannot answer the challenge that, however 
useful foreign law might be to judges, foreign law is an illegitimate 
source when it is invested with any kind of authority. Pragmatic answers 
that point out “the quality of a given foreign solution”115 do not meet 
this legitimacy challenge. 
With regard to coercion, there are indeed situations, such as 
European Union conditionality agreements, where the adoption of a 
certain constitutional standard is the result of external pressure.116 But 
the emphasis on coercion fails to account for voluntary exchanges, 
which have been a salient feature in the interplay between constitutional 
actors from different legal orders. Consider again the interaction 
between constitutional judges. Only the absence of coercion can explain 
why in the “market” for constitutional citations, the most reputable 
courts are those of South Africa, India, Israel, or Canada, despite the 
obvious incapacity of these courts and their states to exercise coercion 
across borders. To be sure, even within such networks there are 
reputational effects. Some instances of constitutional borrowing can be 
“legitimacy-generating.”117 But such effects surely do not qualify as 
coercive.118 
To sum up, these causal accounts, from competition to coercion, 
learning or the self-interest of elites, are illuminating—and are even 
indispensable—but they also remain inescapably partial. They typically 
proceed first by identifying features of the globalization of constitutional 
law and then seek to explain the entire phenomenon by focusing 
exclusively on that feature. By disregarding the greater complexity of the 
constitutional phenomenon, they cannot explain the persistence of 
constitutional dissonance or evaluate its relevance. More importantly, 
these accounts cannot meet the normative challenge of illegitimacy 
because they lack a normative interface between domestic and 
 
 115 Jorg Fedtke, Legal Transplants, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 434 (Jan 
M. Smits ed., 2006) (“The decision to draw on ideas found in other legal systems is . . . often 
justified by the quality of a given foreign solution.”). 
 116 WOJCIECH SADURSKI, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ENLARGEMENT OF EUROPE, at xxiv–
xxv (2012). 
 117 Jonathan Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and 
Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 842 (2003). 
 118 For an argument along these lines, see Vlad Perju, Cosmopolitanism and the Making of A 
New World Order, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 465, 475–81 (2005). 
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transnational constitutionalism—that is, an account of the point of 
transnational “engagement.”119 
I have presented elsewhere the prolegomena to an account of that 
normative interface, specifically of the mechanism through which other 
political communities’ experiments in self-government shape the 
understanding of constitutionalism of another polity.120 I argued there 
that constitutional systems are combinations of (historical) contingency 
and (normative) commitment or principle. Each system establishes 
doctrines that cast light on different dimensions of constitutional 
principles and rights, such as the principles of freedom, equality, and 
self-government that form the identity of republican constitutions. 
However, constitutional claims brought before courts within any one of 
these systems may rely on aspects of a given rule, principle or value that 
are shunned, for various reasons, within the claimant’s own system.121 
Because constitutional doctrine ossifies, the capacity of the 
constitutional system to remain responsive to the claims of its citizens 
risks being diminished.122 Republican constitutions therefore have built-
in corrective mechanisms, such as judicial review, the publication of 
separate opinions, proportionality analysis, the relaxation of standing 
requirements, as well as other mechanisms described in Weinrib’s 
account, to limit the distortive effects between the constitutional system 
and its (self-governing) citizen claimants. Openness to the experiences 
in self-government of other republican constitutional systems is a 
corrective mechanism designed to enhance a constitutional order’s 
responsibility to the demands of its citizens. I discuss below whether 
such openness is best understood as the cosmopolitan hospitality Kant 
refers to in the third definitive article (“Cosmopolitan Right shall be 
limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality”).123 It suffices to point 
out that, from this perspective on the constitutional system, the impulse 
for cross-constitutional interaction is at least partly rooted in the 
constitutional legitimacy of systems that must remain responsive to the 
demands of their self-governing citizens. 
The conclusion for our current purposes is twofold. First, the 
interplay between different constitutional systems can have a profound 
shaping effect on the understanding of the meaning and requirements 
of constitutionalism within the various republics. Second, normative 
 
 119 I mean engagement in the encompassing sense used in JACKSON, supra note 24.  
 120 Vlad Perju, Cosmopolitanism and Constitutional Self-Government, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
326 (2010). 
 121 See, e.g., the reliance on European legal materials for an aspect of constitutional liberty in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) that, at the time the claim was brought, was not 
recognized by American law. 
 122 On the idea of institutional responsiveness, and its connection to Kant’s Perpetual Peace, 
see Bohman, supra note 33, at 191–92.  
 123 See KANT, supra note 9, at 105. 
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principles—such as the duty of responsiveness that public institutions 
owe to their citizens—are not irrelevant, and might in fact be central for 
understanding the interaction among republican constitutions. Only 
when the focus of causal accounts on the self-interest of these systems’ 
main political or institutional actors is supplemented with, or integrated 
within, larger normative frameworks, can these constitutional 
phenomena be understood in their complexity.  
C.     Locating the Sites of Constitutional Convergence 
Once we approach these issues from “a different angle”124, and 
consider republican constitutional orders in relation to one another, 
“why” questions must be supplemented by “what” questions.125 What do 
republican municipal orders share in common? Kant mentions some of 
their salient features, such as the separation of powers, and the principle 
of representation, as well as substantive normative principles. Do the 
practices of contemporary constitutional democracies support this 
account? How do we know that a constitutional order is republican? 
That is, at what level—textual, doctrinal, structural, cultural, ideological, 
or some other level—should one even look to answer this question? 
What is the proper level of generality for locating the sites of 
constitutional convergence? Assuming some degree of convergence 
among the constitutional republics, what exactly is the object of 
convergence? 
A reliable starting point is the existence of written text. As one 
scholar put it, “[r]eading across any large set of constitutional texts, it is 
striking how similar their language is; reading the history of any nation’s 
constitution making, it is striking how much self-conscious borrowing 
goes on.”126 Indeed, at the start of the twenty-first century, virtually all 
states had codified in written form their rules and principles for 
structuring political power. The stature and overall societal traction of 
constitutions varies across jurisdictions, as do their specific structure127 
or methods of future amendment.128 Apart from these details, 
republican constitutions have, for the most part, written constitutions. 
 
 124 IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in KANT: 
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 9, at 41, 53. 
 125 In this section, I build on previous work in Perju, supra note 26.  
 126 Robert E. Goodin, Designing Constitutions: The Political Constitution of a Mixed 
Commonwealth, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSFORMATION: EUROPEAN AND THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 223, 230 (Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds., 1996). 
 127 See Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 714 
(2011). 
 128 Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator 
Problem, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 195 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2011). 
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But locating the text as the site of constitutional convergence can 
mean different things. It can refer to the idea of the written constitution 
or, more frequently, to the text itself. One version of the latter approach 
is to perform textual analysis by comparing the wording of 
constitutions, checking it against the date when the constitution came 
into force, and then charting constitutional trends.129 Versteeg and Law 
have used this method and have found constitutional divergence across 
various axes. The reality, however, calls for greater nuance. Consider the 
axis between constitutional structure and fundamental rights. There are 
obvious differences between systems with regard to constitutional 
structure. Constitutional regimes might share a principle of separation 
of powers, but the exact structuring of the powers differs among 
presidential, parliamentary, and mixed regimes. Fundamental rights 
seem similar. Sharing an insight similar to that of Otto Kahn-Freund, 
who had argued that convergence is easier in private law because public 
law is too central to the interest of politicians who would have an 
interest in not giving up their control,130 Mark Tushnet has argued that, 
“convergence with respect to fundamental rights will occur more 
quickly than convergence with respect to constitutional structures, 
largely because constitutional structures more strongly condition the 
way politics is conducted on the national level and so produce stronger 
counterpressures, through those . . . involved in domestic politics.”131 
Indeed, the provisions of the bills of rights in constitutional democracies 
are strikingly similar. Yet, there remain significant structural differences 
among different constitutional regimes. To speak of convergence at this 
structural level, one would have to go beyond the level of particular 
institutional structure and focus instead on the deeper principles. For 
instance, one would need to look beyond the details of the legislative 
structure—unicameral or bicameral—and focus instead on the deeper 
principle of representation. There might be similarities at that deeper 
level with respect to structure, just as there are differences in the 
interpretation of fundamental rights.  
A focus on the written text should not obviate the importance of 
the larger context. Consider the distinction between convergence and 
liberalization.132 The latter implies the opening of constitutions toward 
the inclusion of rights provisions, whereas convergence requires that the 
same rights be added and that an entire constitutional mindset follow. 
To be sure, some rights are especially important. As we have seen, 
inclusion of the right to property in constitutions, for example, has been 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 Kahn-Freund, supra note 78, at 2–4. 
 131 Tushnet, supra note 23, at 1002. 
 132 Dixon & Posner, supra note 100, at 405 (distinguishing between liberalization and 
convergence). 
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connected to competition to attract economic investors.133 At the same 
time, judgment about the sameness—of rights or non-rights 
provisions—must be closely scrutinized for signs of what has been called 
“nominalism.”134 This is the trap that similar-sounding concepts share 
an identical meaning. The pervasiveness of the English language in the 
comparative constitutional materials can heighten—sometimes 
artificially—the perception of congruence. But behind the same words—
“right to privacy,”135 for example—there might be an entirely different 
constitutional mindset. Yet even when rights are the outcome of 
constitutional borrowing, their meanings change in the course of 
borrowing.136 One cause of nominalism is what has been called 
“modularity.”137 This is an intra-textual or structural approach to 
interpretation that traces difference in meaning to the overall structural, 
doctrinal, or institutional architecture. Provisions are related to other 
provisions, doctrines or larger institutional structures, and so their 
meaning and role can only be understood as part of those complex 
relations.138 
Nominalism and modularity expose the difficulty of drawing 
conclusions about constitutional integration at a purely textual level. 
Integration, or convergence, is a judgment about constitutional 
meaning, and the text, without additional interpretation, is an 
insufficient basis for reaching such a conclusion. It is possible to rest the 
analysis of constitutional convergence at the purely textual, or formal, 
level. But this comes with a heavy price. A purely textual analysis 
remains perfunctory.139 This kind of analysis lumps together 
constitutions from some of the most authoritarian states—
 
 133 Law, supra note 107, at 1308–11.  
 134 See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 794 
(1997); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 
(1999). 
 135 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
YALE. L.J. 1151, 1157 (2004). 
 136 This is the reason why some have argued that legal transplants are impossible. See Pierre 
Legrand, The Same and the Different, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND 
TRANSITIONS 240 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003); Pierre Legrand, On the 
Singularity of Law, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 517, 519–20 (2006). 
 137 See Mark Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cautionary Notes, 
with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Returning 
with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional 
Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325 (1998). 
 138 Tushnet gives as an example how legislative standing in the United States is related to 
provisions authorizing judicial review and generally to the overall structure of the separation of 
powers. Tushnet, Returning with Interest, supra note 137, at 330–31; see also Mark Tushnet, 
Some Reflections on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, supra note 26, at 67. 
 139 Apart perhaps from insights into the very idea of the written constitution, by contrast to 
constitutional custom, see John Gardner, Can There Be a Written Constitution?, in 1 OXFORD 
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 162 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011). 
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“constitutions without constitutionalism”140—with liberal 
democracies.141 Yet, even in the case of property rights, their appeal does 
not derive from the mere wording of the constitution but, rather, from 
their effective enforcement throughout the legal system. The emphasis 
on meaning gives greater promise to a study of constitutional 
integration.142 
But once the search turns to meaning, that is, the study of 
constitutional integration starts with text but it should not end there, its 
object becomes considerably more complex. In particular, what makes a 
constitutional order republican becomes more nebulous. Where else to 
look, beyond text? 
Another candidate for convergence is the method of interpreting 
the constitutional text. Proportionality is a structured—and, its 
defenders argue, a principled143—method of interpretation, and it is a 
mechanism for asserting whether governmental action has 
impermissibly interfered with a constitutional right. The method divides 
the constitutional analysis into a series of distinct steps, which the 
constitutional interpreter must follow in order to determine the 
constitutional validity of the challenged method. As Alec Stone Sweet 
and Jud Mathews wrote, “[b]y the end of the 1990s, virtually every 
effective system of constitutional justice in the world, with the partial 
exception of the United States, had embraced the main tenets of 
[proportionality analysis]. . . . [It has become] a foundational element of 
global constitutionalism.”144 
Yet the problem with any judicial method of interpreting 
constitutional text, including proportionality, is its instability as the 
object of constitutional convergence. At one level, proportionality is 
exclusively a judicial method, although studies show that legislators go 
through a method of reasoning similar to the one they know courts will 
use in determining the constitutionality of the legislative measures.145 
More to the point, convergence on a methodological approach is partial, 
for that method by necessity rests on an entire background 
 
 140 H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an 
African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993). 
 141 It is true that scholars have suggested that “the globalization of constitutional law might 
occur even in somewhat authoritarian nations.” Tushnet, supra note 23, at 997. 
 142 This richer understanding of convergence, which includes the constitutional text but 
goes beyond it to incorporate processes of constitutional meaning and creation, is standard in 
the literature. See Elkins, Ginsburg & Simmons, supra note 25, at 62 (defining convergence of 
rights as the “increasing similarity in legal texts and broader discourses about rights among 
different countries”). 
 143 See BARAK, supra note 79, at 7; see also MOSHE COHEN-ELIYA AND DR. IDDO PORAT, 
PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE (2013).  
 144 Sweet & Mathews, supra note 79, at 74, 160.  
 145 Id. at 111 (discussing these developments in the German constitutional context). 
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constitutional architecture (the judicial role, the structure of the courts 
system, rules about precedent). If shared, that background architecture 
would itself be the object of convergence. Finally, the level of 
methodology is unstable also because of its direct connection to 
judgments about constitutional legitimacy. In societies where deep 
pluralism is part of the circumstances of constitutional justice, and 
where constitutional law performs essential stability functions, 
agreement on a certain method signifies acceptance of an approach to 
constitutional legitimation. Therefore, agreement on method stands for 
agreement on a larger model or framework for legitimizing the exercise 
of coercion. Proportionality, however, has been vigorously challenged as 
legitimizing a type of cost-benefit analysis that stands in contrast to the 
deontological nature of rights.  
Perhaps the object of convergence must be sought at a more 
general level of abstraction, such as the ideology of republican 
constitutions. At one level, it seems clear that the spread of 
constitutionalism has brought with it the ideological overtones of liberal 
democracies. Many have argued that the emphasis on rights and the rule 
of law marks an ideology of liberalism. As Mark Tushnet put it, it is 
necessary to give ideology a distinct role such as “rule of law 
considerations for the judges in transnational networks and substantive 
commitments to human rights for the highly skilled.”146 However, the 
difficulty with identifying constitutional ideology as the site of 
convergence is that scholars have found evidence of polarization, 
specifically at the ideological level. A survey of world constitutions has 
shown ideological clustering has happened in two directions: one 
libertarian and the other social-democratic.147 There are different 
interpretations of the importance of ideological polarizations. Law and 
Versteeg argue that: 
Domestic constitutionalism is, in part, both a locus and a 
manifestation of geopolitical conflict and rivalry. The growing 
interdependence and increasingly permeable borders that define 
globalization only serve to heighten the impact of such conflict on 
the viability of national constitutional norms. A less utopian vision of 
the future of global constitutionalism might thus predict the division 
of the world into rival camps that champion incompatible 
conceptions of constitutionalism.148 
By contrast, Tushnet has argued that, “the globalization of domestic 
constitutional law will lead to convergence not towards classical 
liberalism, but to some sort of social democratic liberalism.”149 
 
 146 Tushnet, supra note 23, at 994. 
 147 Law & Versteeg, supra note 105.  
 148 Id. at 1173 (footnote omitted). 
 149 Tushnet, supra note 23, at 999. 
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Wherever the truth may lie, evidence of ideological polarization 
cautions against using ideology as the site of convergence. 
A more promising answer is the constitutional, or, better yet, 
constitutionalist mindset. According to Martti Koskenniemi, who 
theorized this “Copernican turn in legal theory,”150 the constitutionalist 
mindset captures the attitude and spirit in which law regulates the 
conduct of politics and power. The argument here is that the existence 
of constitutional provisions instilling substantive principles of freedom, 
self-government, and equality, or structural imperatives such as the 
separation of powers, is necessary but insufficient. These principles need 
to be interpreted and applied in the complex realities of constitutional 
democracies. The constitutionalist mindset speaks to the state of mind 
of public officials in republican constitutions when engaged in that 
process of interpretation. By contrast to architectural approaches, which 
presuppose the existence of more or less rigid structures, the mindset 
assumes the existence of flexibility and the necessity of choice. It speaks 
of an attitude of the decision-maker when choices must be made in 
interpreting the conflict between powers or the application of a 
constitutional principle. Such a mindset is indispensable because 
“[m]ere constitutional architectonics”—i.e., text, structure, doctrine, or 
even method—“provide[] a poor guarantee for freedom.”151 
Koskenniemi contrasts the constitutional mindset with legalism, which 
assumes that the application of rules is a matter of pure logical 
deduction and decisionism, which denies that the freedom of the 
decision-maker can ever be constrained by rules.152 Relying on Kant’s 
idea of constitutionalism, Koskenniemi places the essence of the rule of 
law in the “the judgment of the law-applier.”153 Since rules do not 
regulate the conditions of their own application, mere existence of a 
specific structure leaves open the questions of interpretation and 
application. To be sure, interpretation depends on existing legal rules 
and constitutional structures. It also presupposes that these structures 
are moderately efficient because, if they were not, the officials would not 
share in the constitutionalist mindset. 
 
 150 Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About 
International Law and Globalization, in 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 9, 31 (2007). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 12 (“[T]he rule of law in this Kantian image relates to the way the law-applier 
(administrator, public official, lawyer) approaches the task of judging within the narrow space 
between fixed textual understandings (positivism) on the one hand, and predetermined 
functional objectives (naturalism) on the other, without endorsing the proposition that the 
decisions emerge from a ‘legal nothing’ (decisionism).”). 
 153 Id. at 11. The emphasis on application should not detract from the legislative stage. 
Koskenniemi is clear: “Law’s virtue does not lie only in law-application. It resides equally in 
legislation as the expression of a community’s self-determining will.” Id. at 25. 
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The constitutionalist mindset is the result of disaggregating the 
various elements of the Kantian account of the features of republican 
constitutions, which are then re-assembled into a whole larger than the 
sum of its parts. The latter is the constitutionalist mindset shared at least 
by officials in a republican constitutional order and incorporates the text 
and context that enable rule by law, rather than by fiat. Surveying the 
text and doctrine of constitutional systems around the world, both 
formally and substantively, it is possible to find a certain overlap in the 
commitment to using the constitution to codify the self-government of 
free communities of equals. The constitutional principles of freedom, 
equality, and self-government take different institutional forms across 
the word, as one would expect they would, and they have different, 
sometimes conflicting, interpretations. But they all share a set of 
principles that put the exercise of political power to the discipline of law.  
Is this a descriptive argument, that the object of constitutional 
convergence in the world today is the constitutionalist mindset of public 
officials and constitutional subjects? Or is it a normative argument, that 
laterally-conducted integration of constitutional republics requires 
sharing in such a mindset? Kantians typically answer “both” to such 
questions. Such an answer is understandable from the perspective of a 
normative reconstruction of a constitutional practice. Indeed, asking the 
“what” question, by contrast to having an exclusive focus on causality,  
invites that dual perspective.  
In conclusion, let us note that part of this constitutionalist mindset 
is an understanding of how and why the constitutional life of other 
republics is relevant to the experiment in self-government of one’s own 
political community. This is an attitude of openness—or cosmopolitan 
hospitality, to use Kantian jargon—to other constitutional systems that 
can be classified as republics. Yet, an emphasis on openness—or on the 
idea of the mindset itself—is too frail and underdetermined a ground. 
The idea of the mindset itself needs to be integrated within a broader 
goal that can give it direction and specify it further.  
III.     COSMOPOLITANISM AS A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
A.     The Goal of Perpetual Peace 
Kant’s emphasis on republican constitutions reflects the view that 
this type of constitution “is the only constitution which can lead to a 
perpetual peace.”154 Peace is a principle of ordering in the sense 
 
 154 KANT, supra note 9, at 100. Kant goes on to argue that, “the republican constitution is the 
only one which does complete justice to the rights of man.” Id. at 112 (emphasis omitted). 
PERJU.35.2 (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2013  4:21 PM 
742 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:711 
discussed above. As Otfried Höffe has pointed out, Kant is the only 
philosopher and “to date the only great thinker to have elevated the 
concept of peace to the status of a foundational concept of 
philosophy.”155 Unlike other political thinkers, including Hobbes,156 
Kant understood that securing domestic peace is incomplete without 
protecting it through a global system that makes war impossible.157 
However, peace can be understood in at least one of two ways. It means, 
first, non-aggression. Second, it refers to the condition in which social 
order makes freedom possible: the “universal rule of law.”158 
As far as non-aggression is concerned, perpetual peace is more 
than the state of affairs that marks the end of hostilities in a particular 
situation. Calling such a state of affairs peaceful is “pure illusion,”159 
since that peace is only the circumstantial outcome of how political 
interests happen to align at a particular point in time. The real 
question—Kant’s question—concerns the conditions that end the 
possibility of war altogether.160 
This connection between republican constitutions and 
cosmopolitan peace—or, put differently, the idea of “domestic justice as 
a precondition for establishing a global civil condition of public 
right”161—has received a great deal of scholarly attention, to which I 
return below. It suffices for now to point out that, as historical testing 
shows,162 a defensible connection between the two demonstrates that 
 
 155 HÖFFE, supra note 22, at xv. This internal-external connection has been made by Kantian 
scholars who noticed that Kant’s view of international peace evolved from early on under the 
influence of the French revolution and specifically in a republican direction. As Kleingeld 
writes, “Kant’s republican notion of the state may well explain his change of view regarding the 
way peace should be pursued.” KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 48. 
 156 TUCK, supra note 48, at 214–15 (“Like Rousseau, Kant saw very clearly that the 
Hobbesian theory entailed no end to the state of war . . . .”); see also Reiss, supra note 36, at 10 
(discussing the similar problem for Kant and Hobbes: “the basic political problem is the same 
for both: to turn a state of war into a state of order and peace”). 
 157 KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 164 (“[E]nlightenment is possible only when the just state is 
not threatened by outside forces. Warfare between states tends to stifle development within 
states.”). 
 158 CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, INEVITABLE PEACE 29 (1948) (defining the “universal rule of 
law” as “a scheme of organization which would guarantee universal and eternal peace”). 
 159 KANT, supra note 104, at 92.  
 160 On what Kant means by “war,” see IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 482 (1996) 
(“1) [S]tates, considered in external relation to one another, are (like lawless savages) by nature 
in a nonrightful condition. 2) This nonrightful condition is a condition of war (of the rights of 
the stronger), even if it is not a condition of actual war and actual attacks being constantly 
made (hostilities). Although no state is wronged by another in this condition (insofar as neither 
wants anything better), this condition is in itself still wrong in the highest degree, and states 
neighboring upon one other are under obligation to leave it.”).  
 161 BROWN, supra note 3, at 96.  
 162 The classic work remains MICHAEL W. DOYLE, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 
in LIBERAL PEACE 13–60 (2012). At a regional level, the project of European integration after 
the Second World War deserves mention. Peace has been a leitmotif of Europe’s evolution from 
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while democracies are indeed more hesitant to go to war with each 
other, that inclination gives way when they are confronted with non-
democracies.163 
By itself, non-aggression is too narrow a normative framework for 
the transformation of constitutional law. Nor is non-aggression a 
particularly convincing goal without having worked out the foreign 
policy dimensions of the principles of domestic constitutionalism. 
Nevertheless, non-aggression should not be entirely dismissed in its 
relevance as a byproduct, as well as enabling condition, of the other 
dimension of perpetual peace, namely as a universal rule of law. The 
external (non-aggression) and internal (rule of law) dimensions are 
related as a matter of both political morality164 and law.165 As I have 
argued, the structure of Kant’s three definitive articles, and specifically 
the connection between domestic and global justice, is rooted, through 
law, in a deeper philosophical continuity of the different levels of 
normative order: domestic, international, and cosmopolitan.166  
The grounds for the deep continuity between the domestic and 
supranational levels are revealed once peace is understood as a 
“fundamental theme not only of Kant’s political thought but of his 
entire philosophy.”167 Peace is the sine qua non condition for having a 
civil—republican—constitution, which constitutes the only framework 
 
the Schuman Declaration (1950) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). See generally ANDREW 
WILLIAMS, THE ETHOS OF EUROPE: VALUES, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE EU 22–69 (2010). 
 163 HÖFFE, supra note 22, at 177–87 (questioning the claim that republics are inherently 
peaceful). Höffe argues that democracies might be more hesitant to go to war, or inclined not to 
go to war with each other, or inclined to be peaceful generally—but they cannot be said to be 
fundamentally opposed to war. Id. at 186. He then details the conditions under which Kant’s 
claim about the fundamental peaceable nature of republics holds true: “[s]elf-interest [which is 
all Kant relies on] in no way speaks against all wars if one (1) trusts more in weapons than in 
troops; (2) places only voluntary, not conscripted troops into service; (3) wages war only 
against weaker opponents,” and (4) stands to gain economically from the war. Id.  
 164 BROWN, supra note 3, at 46 (“Kant believed that domestic justice could not flourish 
without the state also being secured in its external relations through a legal condition of 
international right.”); KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 66 (“Even a small increase in stability will 
already allow for more internal development within states. From his first writings on history 
onwards, Kant repeatedly expresses his view that less war means more development within 
states—development of the political institutions, education, and enlightenment in general.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 165 HÖFFE, supra note 22, at 150 (“The peace Kant discusses is, as a mere protection of life 
and freedom, a legal task.”).  
 166 Consider, for instance, how the principle of publicity applies to all levels. Seyla Benhabib 
points to the principle of publicity: “Kant’s transcendental condition of publicity mediates 
between morals and politics by assuring that no legislator can pass a law that would be 
incompatible with its being made public to people who fall under its jurisdiction. . . . The 
transcendental principle of publicity applies at the cosmopolitan level no less than at the level of 
bounded communities.” BENHABIB, supra note 15, at 150–51 (footnote omitted); see also 
BROWN, supra note 3, at 96 (“Kant altered the Hobbesian paradigm by focusing on domestic 
justice as a precondition for establishing a global civil condition of public right.”). On publicity, 
see KANT, supra note 9, at 125. 
 167 HÖFFE, supra note 22, at 136. 
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in which freedom is possible. “[A] civil constitution determined by laws 
is complete only when it exists not only among individual human 
beings, but also among states.”168 This is the security, non-aggression 
level. In that sense, perpetual peace means a cosmopolitan system of 
general political security. 
Yet non-aggression has domestic roots. Kant explains the 
propensity for peace of constitutional democracies by reference to the 
self-interest of these citizens who would not chose to put themselves 
through the miseries of war. To be sure, within a Kantian framework, 
self-interest is not a matter of raw preference but it is itself the product 
of reflection. Self-interest is important given Kant’s enduring belief that 
institutional structures have an impact in shaping the lives of the 
individuals who live under them.169 It is, in fact, this very effect that 
underlies the continuity of attitudes with regard to the rule of law 
between the domestic and the transnational levels: “The respect for law 
which prevails in a republican state makes it incumbent upon its citizens 
and its government to establish a similar system of law in international 
affairs.”170 What, then, explains Kant’s emphasis on self-interest? The 
only plausible explanation seems to be his concern with protecting his 
account from charges of utopianism.171 However much he believed in 
the possibility of moral enlightenment, the availability of a platform for 
the expression of self-interest within constitutional democracies 
provided sufficient basis for the connection between republican 
constitutions and the goal of securing perpetual peace. 
Cosmopolitanism, then, is not an end in itself. Its role is to secure 
the conditions that make perpetual peace possible. At the same time, 
cosmopolitanism should not be understood in an instrumental way. The 
cosmopolitan condition makes peace possible, just as peace creates the 
conditions that make freedom, equality, and self-government possible. 
Peace is social order, the universal rule of law, which itself is a necessary 
 
 168 Id. at 169. 
 169 See KANT, supra note 9, at 113 (“[W]e cannot expect [people’s] moral attitudes to 
produce a good political constitution; on the contrary, it is only through the latter that the 
people can be expected to attain a good level of moral culture.”); see also KLEINGELD, supra note 
7, at 179 (“Kant remains committed to the view that legal institutions (at the national and 
international levels) play a crucial role in the development of cosmopolitan moral attitudes.”). 
 170 Reiss, supra note 36, at 35; see KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 33 (“A just republic and its 
citizens will naturally conduct themselves in a way that is peaceful and just toward non-citizens 
internally and toward other states and non-citizens in their external relations. In other words, 
whenever cosmopolitans work on behalf of freedom and justice within their own countries, 
they do so in a way that is compatible with promoting justice elsewhere, too.”). 
 171 Concerns about feasibility are central to accounts of world peace. See RAWLS, supra note 
19, at 82–83, 119, 124 (contrasting a cosmopolitan vision to that of a Society of Peoples and 
defending his account from charges of utopianism); see also KELSEN, supra note 7. For a 
discussion, in the Kantian context, see Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Theory of the State, in 
IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, 
AND HISTORY 179–200 (Pauline Kleingeld, ed., David L. Colclasure trans., 2006). 
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solution to what Kant calls the “unsocial sociability of [persons].”172 The 
existence of the state, and thus the very possibility of freedom, depends 
on it. It is in this sense that peace is built on a process of civilization and 
education that enable “a universal cosmopolitan existence.”173 
Therefore, an instrumental understanding of peace would be 
incongruous with this entire approach. “[C]osmopolitan law goes 
beyond mutual security and is also meant as the legal foundation for 
continued interconnection and development that may eventually bring 
human beings closer to understanding each other as mutual citizens.”174 
We have here part of the answer to the question, how can the 
interaction of constitutional republics contribute to the goal of 
perpetual peace? From a Kantian perspective, the prima facie case is 
two-fold. First, it relies on an understanding of peace that means more 
than non-aggression—at least among constitutional democracies—and 
refers to the institutional conditions that make freedom possible. The 
constitutionalist mindset of officials charged with interpreting and 
applying the rules epitomizes these conditions. Secondly, the interaction 
sets in motion broader societal learning processes and makes available 
forms of reasoning that allow self-governing citizens to recognize 
dimensions of their selves across jurisdictional boundaries. 
Underpinning this model, but optional for the model’s overall cogency, 
is Kant’s Enlightenment view of the “progressive improvement [of the 
human race] in relation to the moral end of its existence.”175 Because 
people find in others dimensions of their own freedom, and, through 
them, get to understand themselves more fully, they discover a shared 
identity that integrates and transcends—without rejecting—their 
institutional affiliation to their own state. But what about this form of 
 
 172 KANT, The Idea of a Universal History, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 9, at 44 
(“The means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that 
of antagonism within society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of 
a law-governed social order. By antagonism, I mean in this context the unsocial sociability of 
men, that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual 
resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 173 KANT, supra note 9, at 51. 
 174 BROWN, supra note 3, at 47. As Habermas explains,  
The abolition of war is a command of reason. . . . From Kant’s republican 
perspective, there is . . . a conceptual connection between the role of law in 
promoting peace and the role of a legal condition that citizens can accept as 
legitimate in promoting freedom. The cosmopolitan extension of a condition of civil 
liberties first secured within the constitutional state is not only pursued because it 
gives rise to perpetual peace, but also for its own stake, as a command of reason. 
Hence, “establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes not merely a part . . . but 
rather the final end of the doctrine of right.” 
Habermas, supra note 12, at 121 (third alteration in original). 
 175 KANT, supra note 9, at 88. See generally Alan Wood, Kant’s Philosophy of History, in 
TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTORY, supra 
note 171, at 243.  
PERJU.35.2 (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2013  4:21 PM 
746 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:711 
reasoning would not be available through interactions at the federative, 
international level, and therefore at the cross-constitutional level? 
Without such an answer, it is unclear why the cross-constitutional level 
would not at most replicate interactions at the international level. 
In reality, the cross-constitutional level adds a great deal more than 
what the international system can provide. As we will see in the next 
Section, Kant conceived of the international federation as a minimal 
institutional framework. Such an international federation must be 
supplemented by the rich interactions among constitutional systems in 
order to gain the legitimacy and play the role that Kant expects from 
them. Because the international structure is minimal, and its point is 
mainly to secure perpetual non-aggression, the background stability of 
enabling conditions for individual freedom require interchange across a 
wide range of constitutional topics. The socialization of both individual 
right-holders with one another, and state officials, must take place 
within a medium more wide-ranging than the minimal international 
federation. 
B.     Ius Gentium: The International Federation 
If reason demands that war be abolished, one way to make war 
impossible is to dissolve the conventional actors that can wage war: 
states. Once integrated within a world republic, war between states 
becomes impossible, and all conflict is merely a domestic challenge to 
order within the new republic.176 Since Kant famously, and 
controversially, argued that citizens of a state—regardless of size—do 
not have a right to civil disobedience,177 the option in favor of a world 
republic seems to have irresistible appeal. There is also another way to 
get to this same conclusion. It starts from the moral arbitrariness of 
borders and factors in the imperative that law should follow the 
demands of morality. A united world, one without borders but which is 
nevertheless organized in a political structure, is a world republic. This 
world republic, an international state, can take either unitary or 
federative form, the latter with the caveat about the role of its 
boundaries. 
 Kant rejects both of these paths and, with them, the argument for a 
world republic.178 Much to the puzzlement of his commentators, the 
 
 176 For this interpretation, see Habermas, supra note 12, at 123.  
 177 See, e.g., CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 148–49 (1996). 
 178 This point is all the more significant given that Kant had earlier advocated an 
international state. Perpetual Peace presents a new argument from Kant. Previously, in 
Universal History, he had argued for a strong federal authority, rather than a voluntary, non-
coercive federation of states. See KANT, supra note 9, at 127 (“[P]ermanent and free 
association . . . . without some kind of lawful condition which actively links together the various 
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second definitive article states: “The Right of Nations shall be based on a 
Federation of Free States.” Perpetual peace does not require the 
unification of the world into one political formation.179 A plurality of 
jurisdictions, joined in a non-coercive league of states each with its own 
sovereign constitutional jurisdiction formed on a “republican 
constitution,” is the projected means toward the goal of securing a 
perpetual peace.180 The identity of each jurisdiction, through its 
constitutional system, remains protected.181 
Why prefer a plurality of states to a unified political formation? Is 
the world state ruled out at this particular stage in history, or is such 
supranational unification undesirable under any historical 
circumstances? Is any significant power exercised at the supranational 
level, and, if so, aren’t global institutions necessary to secure the rule of 
law, rather than fiat, at the supranational level? Put differently, does an 
international federation have the powers to guarantee perpetual peace 
or do those powers have to be supplemented and, if so, how? 
Kant’s explanations for opting for a federation are somewhat 
sketchy. In what follows, I suggest that his emphasis on the republican 
constitutions, understood along the lines discussed in the previous 
Sections, explains in large measure the rejection of a world state and 
choice for a federation. The emphasis on the relation between the 
domestic and the supranational levels, and on the relation between the 
three definitive articles, shows that the key to accepting a plurality of 
jurisdictions is the conception of the internal organization of the state.182 
I also suggest that the relations that constitutional republics establish 
with one another is at least compatible, and, at least in the first stages of 
development, must perhaps even be presupposed by the rather 
 
physical or moral persons . . . the only possible form of right is a private one.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 179 KANT, supra note 9, at 102. For a comprehensive discussion of the federation versus 
unitary state, see FLIKSCHUH, supra note 31, at 187. 
 180 On the issue of sovereignty, see HÖFFE, supra note 22, at 195 (“The federation of peoples 
is made up of sovereign partners that maintain their sovereignty entirely.”). But see BENHABIB, 
supra note 15, at 29 (“State sovereignty is no longer the ultimate arbiter of the fate of citizens or 
residents. The exercise of state sovereignty even within domestic borders is increasingly subject 
to internationally recognized norms that prohibit genocide, ethnocide, mass expulsions, 
enslavement, rape, and forced labor.”); see also BROWN, supra note 3, at 111 (“[S]overeignty is 
conditional within the Kantian federation. It is conditioned on the normative principles of 
popular sovereignty, conditions of public right, equal justice, external freedom and universal 
law.”).  
 181 These questions are important because there is an ambiguity in comparative 
constitutional law. The reference to “comparative” clearly assumes the existence of a plurality 
of jurisdictions. Yet, it is often unclear what the point of that plurality is. One answer to the 
ambiguity is to refer to global constitutionalism, rather than comparative constitutionalism. 
 182 KANT, supra note 9, at 123 (arguing that states “should have an internal constitution 
organised in accordance with pure principles of right, and also that it unite with other 
neighbouring or even distant states to arrive at a lawful settlement of their differences by 
forming something analogous to a universal state”). 
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minimalistic approach to the international federation. I do not make the 
strong claim that such interactions are necessary to Kant’s account of 
Perpetual Peace, though I do not find that strong claim necessarily 
implausible. 
Kant’s heavy reliance on republicanism in the domestic context 
renders the imperative of a world state less stringent. Scholars such as 
Pauline Kleingeld, have argued that, “Kant’s republican notion of the 
state may well explain his change of view regarding the way peace 
should be pursued,”183 and specifically that it should be pursued through 
a federation rather than an international state. But Kleingeld seems to 
have in mind specifically the idea of self-determination, since she writes 
that Kant’s “republicanism rules out the coercive establishment of a 
world state, on the one hand, and supports the feasibility of a strong 
international federation, on the other.”184 Now, it is certainly correct to 
point out Kant’s concern with self-determination.185 As Kleingeld 
argues, making the federation coercive would allow stronger states to 
exert pressure on the weaker states.186 But there is more to the emphasis 
on the republican constitution. If each state offers the guarantees of a 
republican constitution, that is, if each state secures the conditions for 
freedom within its own jurisdiction, the need for a world state is 
accordingly mitigated. States will enter a voluntary federation that will 
secure the peace, so that the federation will “extend[] gradually to 
encompass all states and thus lead[] to perpetual peace.”187 The one 
dimension that remains uncovered is the trans-border transactions such 
as the movement of persons, of communication, etc. The third definitive 
article on cosmopolitan right, and specifically the duty of hospitality, is 
meant to cover exactly this situation. The essence of this interpretation 
is the focus on the republican constitution. 
 
 183 KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 48. 
 184 Id. at 49. 
 185 HÖFFE, supra note 22, at 194 (“A world organization that arrogated to itself more 
responsibilities than that of securing international peace would violate the state right to 
(political and cultural) self-determination.”). Höffe also argues that “a homogenous world state 
would violate state rights. An international state, by contrast, would not dissolve the peoples of 
the primary states, but rather only contest their exclusive right to a state form. It would develop 
as a secondary state or state of states.” Id. at 197. 
 186 KANT, supra note 9, at 117 (“[A] state which is self-governing and free from all external 
laws will not let itself become dependent on the judgment of other states in seeking to uphold 
its rights against them.”). Kleingeld places emphasis on the voluntary nature of states joining 
the federation of states. The citizens of republics cannot be forced into joining an international 
federation. KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 53–55. As Kleingeld explains Kant’s position, “the 
people should be put in a position to determine themselves the shape of their political 
institutions. Kant has good reason then, given his broader republican commitments, not to 
sanction the coercive formation of a state of states as a matter of right, and therefore to 
advocate a league instead.” Id. at 57 (emphasis omitted). 
 187 KANT, supra note 9, at 104. 
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Kant’s chosen path toward achieving peace is a voluntary, non-
coercive federation of states. This federation is a political formation. He 
distinguishes a pacific federation from a peace treaty. Whereas a treaty 
would put an end to one war, the federation would end all wars by 
ending the “general warlike condition.”188 The federation is limited in 
scope and set up entirely for the purpose of securing peace: it “does not 
aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and 
secure the freedom of each state in itself.”189 States belonging to the 
federation—whose vocation is to expand over time to encompass all 
states—derive their security “automatically,” “from a united power and 
the law-governed decisions of a united will,” rather than by virtue of 
“[their] own power or [their] own legal judgment.”190 In this sense, it 
can be said that the federation juridifies the international sphere. 
But Kant remains sketchy on the details of the federation. For 
instance, the federation does not have a separation of power like that 
which the first definitive article calls for at the domestic level. Given its 
focus on collective security, commentators have referred to it as “an 
ultraminimal world state . . . with respect to its governing structure.”191 
Is this solution sufficiently stable? Can a federation of such limited 
powers deliver on its goal of securing perpetual peace? One concern is 
that such a limited federation will prove too weak or unstable to 
withstand political pressure at times of deep crisis. One possibility is 
that the powers of the federation will expand over time. The expansion 
can happen through a version of spillover effects, or with the consent of 
the member states, or—more likely—through a combination of both. 
The evolution of the European Union, which is probably the political 
organization that comes closest to Kant’s idea, shows how this process 
could unfold—either unanimously among the members of the 
federation or using the system of enhanced cooperation.192 
But because such expansion cannot be assumed, the sources of the 
stability of the international federation must be sought elsewhere. One 
such place is domestic constitutionalism itself: More specifically the 
constitutionalist mindset within republican constitutional orders. In 
Kant’s account, these constitutions set in motion learning processes 
whose object is not only the relation between individuals and the state 
within the confines of the state, but also the outward manifestations of 
the state. This places a very significant burden on domestic 
constitutions. However, the learning processes are likely to be more 
 
 188 Id. at 104. 
 189 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 190 Id. at 47–48. 
 191 HÖFFE, supra note 22, at 193. 
 192 See, e.g., Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The European Constitution and Cosmopolitan Ideals, 7 
COLUM J. EUR. L. 21 (2001). 
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effective when they rely less on the actors’ imagination and more on 
direct cross-jurisdictional exchanges. The interplay between 
constitutional republics within the integrated constitutional spaces I 
discussed above supplements the purely domestic level. It places the 
republican constitutions within a sounding board for their doctrinal 
choices and an environment in which to work out, in the presence of 
others but consistent with each jurisdiction’s self-determination, the 
implications of their normative choices. As we have seen, the range of 
those interactions is very significant. It goes far beyond issues of security 
to which exchanges in the international federation are confined. These 
direct, non-hierarchical features make the international federation far 
more stable than it would otherwise be. 
But why does reason call for a plurality of states joined in a 
federation rather than for an international state? Kant’s insistence on 
the federation is intriguing, especially since he was not oblivious of the 
world republic argument.193 He sees the creation of a world republic as 
the solution for “emerg[ing] from the lawless condition of pure 
warfare.”194 An “international state” would eventually grow to 
encompass all the peoples of the world—peoples, not states. In that 
sense, the state’s vocation is similar to that of a republic, which is also to 
encompass all the states. 
The choice of a plurality of jurisdictions is not (necessarily) 
arbitrary. Seyla Benhabib points to Kant’s “extremely important move” 
of carefully distinguishing between a “world government” and a “world 
federation.”195 She writes that, “[a] ‘world government’ would only 
result in a ‘universal monarchy,’ . . . and would be a ‘soulless despotism,’ 
whereas a federative union . . . would still permit the exercise of 
citizenship within bounded communities.”196 Similarly, Otfried Höffe 
points out “the right of nations to retain their idiosyncrasies in the same 
way that individuals may retain them in individual states. The ‘fusion’ of 
peoples into a single, homogeneous people of the state is prohibited.”197 
But Höffe builds his argument, and criticism of Kant, on the fact that 
state sovereignty is not limited, and Kant develops a second-best 
strategy to avoid a pure state of war when states hold fast to their 
sovereignty—“[t]his strategy is to enter contractual agreements without 
a state character, that is, to establish a federation of peoples instead of an 
international state. . . . [But it] is a mere cease-fire.”198 Thus, Höffe 
 
 193 Indeed, Kant himself had previously advocated a world republic. See KANT, supra note 9, 
at 122. 
 194 Id. at 105. 
 195 BENHABIB, supra note 15, at 24. 
 196 Id. 
 197 HÖFFE, supra note 22, at 196. 
 198 Id. at 200. 
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concludes, “Kant’s moderate political cosmopolitanism is more 
precisely both a complementary and subsidiary cosmopolitanism.”199 
Yet there is an interesting ambiguity in Kant’s equivocation 
between a federation of states and an international state. At one level, 
Kant appears concerned with the conditions for the practical realization 
of perpetual peace. He mentions that the idea of federalism as a path to 
peace is “practicable and has objective reality,” and he further notes that 
the international state “is not the will of the nations, according to their 
present conception of international right . . . [so] the positive idea of a 
world republic cannot be realised.”200 
His concern can be easily interpreted as an answer to critics who, 
even during his time, were mocking the utopian dimension of the 
cosmopolitan project. But such a concern with the conditions for 
practical realization has been aptly called “unKantian.”201 Kant’s 
emphasis throughout his moral philosophy is on the requirements of 
reason, rather than the conditions for the realization of those 
requirements. A sudden change of register signals Kant’s 
uncharacteristic concession. 
Kant’s argument about a plurality of states is consistent as a 
preliminary stage at which cosmopolitanism becomes instilled in the 
constitutional law of the different republics. Yet this federative structure 
is only an intermediate stage that, from the perspective of Kant’s 
philosophy of history, opens the way to at least the possibility of a world 
stage.202 The league is a step towards the “initiat[ion of] the departure 
from the international state of nature.”203 
At the same time, and this is the equivocation I mentioned, there 
are elements in Kant to argue that the federative solution is “negative,” 
intermediary in nature, and does not rule out a possible—perhaps even 
necessary—next stage. The federation is the only conclusion possible 
given his starting assumption, namely the plurality of states. Since the 
object of inquiry is the “right of nations in relation to one another,”204 a 
federation of states whose aim is to end the general warfare condition is 
the only outcome. Because the positive solution of an international state 
is not available, and “[i]f all is not to be lost, this can at best find a 
negative substitute in the shape of an enduring and gradually expanding 
federation likely to prevent war.”205 
 
 199 Id. at 201 (citation omitted). 
 200 KANT, supra note 9, at 104–05 (emphasis omitted). 
 201 KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 43 (citing Habermas, supra note 3). 
 202 Id. at 44 (“[L]eague [of states is] a first step on the road toward the stronger ideal of a 
state-like international federation of states.”).  
 203 Id. at 51. 
 204 KANT, supra note 9, at 102. 
 205 Id. at 105 (emphasis omitted); see also KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 179 (“Kant remains 
committed to the view that legal institutions (at the national and international levels) play a 
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Practical considerations of implementation of the political project 
are not the only ones weighing against an international state. Like all 
states, the international state could fall prey to “the most fearful 
despotism”206 on a scale proportionate to its size. One can imagine, for 
example, a democratic state where people do not exercise their 
sovereign power through their representatives. While Kant never fleshes 
out this argument, he deems the consequences of the despotic 
international state so debilitating that, however small the risk might be, 
a federation under a commonly accepted international right becomes 
more appealing. The reason is that war is preferable to anarchy. War is 
also preferable to a unified, universal monarchy created by force when a 
strong state overtakes all others. In such a monarchy “the laws 
progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range, 
and a soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of goodness, will 
finally lapse into anarchy.”207 
Kant remains aware of the shortcomings of this (negative) 
solution—and that, indeed, of any solution short of an international 
state. War can always flare back in a federation,208 although that is more 
difficult than if the international sphere had been left entirely un-
juridified.209 But to the extent the federation is successful, that is, to the 
extent it secures peace, a federation is one step toward the creation of 
the conditions—such as the state’s internalization of international right, 
moral learning, education—that will prepare the ground for further 
integration. Theorizing the direct interplay between constitutional 
systems, and integrating it in the framework of Perpetual Peace, is one 
answer to how the international federation can be successful at setting 
the conditions for peace without turning into a world government. 
C.     Ius Cosmopoliticus: Cosmopolitan Hospitality 
Short of a world state, which does away with the distinction 
between internal and external (there would be no foreigners if the world 
were unified in an international state), the coexistence of multiple states 
 
crucial role in the development of cosmopolitan moral attitudes” and “[o]nce their internal 
development and enlightenment have progressed far enough, republican peoples will join a 
world federation voluntarily.”). 
 206 KANT, supra note 9, at 90. 
 207 Id. at 113–14. 
 208 Id. at 105 (The federation “may check the current of man’s inclination to defy the law 
and antagonise his fellows, although there will always be a risk of it bursting forth anew.”). 
 209 HÖFFE, supra note 22, at 198 (“In internal relations, where the state of nature has been 
overcome, [states] are free; but in external relations, where the state of nature continues to 
exist, they are not yet free.”). 
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poses challenges with regard to trans-border issues.210 These are familiar 
challenges involving asylum, deportation, and immigration more 
generally.211 The third definitive article of Perpetual Peace, which 
stipulates a right to hospitality, formally addresses these issues faced by 
world citizens in an international order of multiple states. According to 
this norm, cosmopolitan right—by which Kant refers to the rights of 
citizens of one state in relation to other states—shall be limited to 
conditions of universal hospitality. This is “the right of a stranger not to 
be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory.”212  
At first blush, the right to hospitality is not particularly broad—for 
instance, the stranger does not have a right to be entertained and could 
even be turned away, if doing so would not cause him death. Hospitality 
entitles the right holder only to attempt—rather than succeed—to enter 
relations with those who already inhabit the land to which one travels. 
However, this narrow interpretation of cosmopolitan right does not fit 
easily within a systematic account of Kant’s political thought. 
Commentators have relied on that account to offer broader 
interpretations. With respect to the object of the right, commentators 
have argued that hospitality includes “all human rights claims which are 
cross-border in scope.”213 Moreover, hospitality does not grant 
permission to states to engage in purely self-serving actions. “The point 
of international right and cosmopolitan right is to realize right at a 
global level. . . . [T]he duty of civic patriotism does not require closing 
borders to strangers in need.”214 We find here the same interpretative 
complexity as in the case of other concepts central to Kant’s thought, 
such as perpetual peace. 
The central insight of the third definitive article is that the right—
and corresponding duty—of hospitality is legal in nature. Cosmopolitan 
right stands alongside both domestic constitutional and international 
law as an integral part of public right. They are normatively continuous, 
but separated. This is the cosmopolitan level, where transnational legal 
 
 210 Kleingeld, supra note 12, at 88 n.8 (“‘[U]niversal state of humankind’ should not be taken 
to imply that Kant advocates the establishment of a world state that would absorb existing 
states. It refers to the legal system which unites all humans under common, cosmopolitan 
law.”). 
 211 See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS 
(2004); LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP (2006); DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (2007); AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL 
INEQUALITY (2009).  
 212 KANT, supra note 9, at 105. 
 213 BENHABIB, supra note 15, at 31; see also Kleingeld, supra note 12, at 75 (“Cosmopolitan 
law is concerned with interaction across borders. It covers any kind of communication, 
interaction, trade, or business. It applies to travel, migration, intellectual exchange, as well as to 
commercial endeavors.” (citation omitted)); Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Cosmopolitan Law, 9 EUR. L.J. 
241 (2003) (arguing for a broad interpretation of hospitality). 
 214 Kleingeld, supra note 12, at 79. 
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relations have persons, rather than states, as their object. Benhabib 
writes that, “hospitality is a right that belongs to all human beings 
insofar as we view them as potential participants in a world republic.”215 
This conceptual innovation captures an important jurisprudential 
insight, namely that the legal standpoint need not be jurisdiction-bound. 
As Kant writes, “[t]he idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not 
fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten 
code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal 
right of humanity.”216 The legal perspective is sufficiently broad to 
encompass the universal right of humanity. One need not confine 
oneself to the moral or political standpoint—law is also available.217 
I have argued thus far that Kant insufficiently theorizes the 
interaction between republican constitutional states. I have also called 
his account of republican constitutions “static.” Yet the broad 
interpretation of cosmopolitan right makes the third definitive article a 
possible theoretical framework for cross-constitutional interactions. If 
the right applies to “any kind of communication, interaction, trade, or 
business. It applies to travel, migration, intellectual exchange, as well as 
to commercial endeavors.”218 The question then arises why the right 
could not also apply to the complex phenomenon of constitutional 
exchanges? Such exchanges, as we have seen, are related to the crossing 
of borders. A few questions must be answered, such as who would be 
the holders of these rights. But the model I suggest above offers some 
preliminary solutions. In the case of constitutional interpretation, the 
right-holders would be domestic claimants with an interest in 
operationalizing or implementing the insights that originate in the 
experiences in self-government of other political communities.219 This 
interpretation underscores what Jeremy Waldron called Kant’s 
“emphatically non-nationalist”220 view. It makes hospitality a principle 
central to the constitutionalist mindset as it takes up the interaction 
between republican constitutions.221 It forces a type of normative 
 
 215 BENHABIB, supra note 15, at 22.  
 216 KANT, supra note 9, at 108. 
 217 See BROWN, supra note 3, at 46 (“Kant’s political theory is preoccupied with the moral 
worth and rightful condition of all human beings everywhere.”).  
 218 Kleingeld, supra note 12, at 75. 
 219 For the exact context of this normative reconstruction, see supra Part III; Perju, supra 
note 120. 
 220 Waldron, supra note 32, at 92.  
 221 Moreover, the “law-ness” of cosmopolitan right, which Kant was keen to underscore, 
would not be compromised in this interpretation. It is possible to interpret integrated 
constitutional spaces as spaces in which norms at least “aspire” to juridical status. See Waldron, 
supra note 32, at 96. It is noteworthy, however, that Waldron does not use jus cosmopoliticum, 
but jus gentium, as the jurisprudential framework of these integrated spaces. See WALDRON, 
“PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”, supra note 75.  
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openness that ensures that constitutional cultures of republican states 
will find themselves transformed by the interaction with one another. 
However appealing this account may be, Kant’s account of 
cosmopolitan right does not contain the evidence to support it. To start, 
this account blends different levels of public right. While I have pointed 
out repeatedly the normative continuity within public right—domestic, 
international, and cosmopolitan—it is equally important that the three 
levels be kept separate. A normative reconstruction that sees the 
interplay among republican constitutions as part of cosmopolitan right 
would basically blend the two levels of analysis. Perhaps the risk of 
blending these two levels could be mitigated by requiring that ius 
civitatis incorporate, without residue, the demands of cosmopolitan 
right. But other risks are harder to address. One such risk is that the 
trans-border constitutional phenomena are different in nature from 
cosmopolitan right. The former describe, importantly, bottom-up 
constitutional interactions whereas the cosmopolitan right is best 
understood as top-down. The bottom-up approach ought to be 
preserved because it signifies the primacy of the domestic jurisdictions: 
each constitutional republic retains its filter and sovereignty over any 
ensuing constitutional transplant or migration. Removing that filter 
opens the way to the kind of domestic interferences with self-
determination that Kant speaks against elsewhere in Perpetual Peace.222 
Secondly, the above interpretation relies on the broad 
interpretation of cosmopolitan right that seems at odds with Kant’s 
insistence that the right be confined to actual world citizens who find 
themselves in a foreign land.223 It is true that the right can be plausibly 
interpreted as expressing a deeper principle relevant to all cross-border 
interactions. But Kant explicitly gives it a spatial, territorial dimension 
that is reflected in the right’s origins. Specifically, Kant points out that 
the human race shares in common the possession of the earth’s surface. 
Since “no-one originally has any greater right than anyone else to 
occupy any particular portion of the earth,” man “must necessarily 
tolerate one another’s company.”224 Thence follows Kant’s famous 
 
 222 Kant, supra note 9, at 96. 
 223 We should not interpret this restrictively. Waldron is correct in stating that “hospitality 
is [not] about states or political communities at all, whether at the level of a world republic or 
an individual republic. It is about relations between people and peoples.” Waldron, supra note 
32, at 89. However, in the interpretation suggested above, hospitality is about the openness of 
the jurisdictions of individual republics toward the experiments in self-government of other 
individual republics. In this account, political communities and constitutional jurisdictions are 
relevant though the ultimate beneficiary could be interpreted as the people or peoples. 
 224 KANT, supra note 9, at 106. As Richard Tuck has argued, Kant did not question the 
substance (hospitality) of the theories of international lawyers such as Vattel and Puffendorf, 
whom he had famously called “sorry comforters,” but only that they had failed to give 
hospitality the force of law. See TUCK, supra note 48, at 220; see also Martti Koskenniemi, 
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conclusion: “The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying 
degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point 
where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”225 
Much has been made of Kant’s idea of interdependence, which 
commentators typically handle separately from the specifics of the 
conception of cosmopolitan right.226 Further expanding cosmopolitan 
hospitality to apply to the interaction between constitutional republics 
would be helped by de-territorializing the right, so to speak, perhaps by 
seeking alternative foundations in “[original,] innate human right to 
freedom”227 rather than in the common possession of the earth’s surface. 
Once that work is done, cosmopolitan hospitality might provide an 
alternative framework for understanding the globalization of 
constitutional law and theory.  
IV.     CHALLENGES TO COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A.     The Challenge from Democracy 
How does the argument about the interplay between republican 
constitutions square with the widely shared view that, unlike in other 
areas of law where the need of coordination allows, and might even 
require, a global approach, the deep logic of constitutional law in a 
democracy is self-referential? Just as politicians are committed by virtue 
of the positions they occupy to furthering the welfare of their electorate, 
so, Jack Goldsmith writes in a carefully calibrated and far-reaching 
critique that will be our guide in this Section, “cosmopolitan action by a 
liberal democracy is bounded by constituent preferences.”228 
This challenge leaves open the possibility that a self-governing 
democratic citizenry, either elsewhere or in the future, might adopt a 
cosmopolitan outlook. For instance, one can imagine an educational 
system that teaches citizens to see themselves as members of “a 
complete commonwealth or even of cosmopolitan society.”229 But since 
Goldsmith’s focus is the United States, after surveying electoral results 
and public discourse,230 the author feels bound to conclude: 
 
Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 395 
(2009). 
 225 KANT, supra note 9, at 107–08 (emphasis omitted). 
 226 Id. 
 227 See Kleingeld, supra note 12, at 78–79 (seeking alternative foundations for the right to 
hospitality, in the “[original,] innate human right to freedom”). 
 228 Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 1686. 
 229 KANT, supra note 9, at 56. 
 230 In what follows I defer to Goldsmith’s account of the self-understanding of U.S. citizens 
with regard to self-interest and altruism. The challenge from democracy is strongest under 
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This conception of the democratic process does not, in my view, 
mean that the U.S. government could plausibly engage in more 
generous acts of cosmopolitan charity. Even political leaders with 
powerful cosmopolitan sentiments who are unworried about 
reelection hesitate to engage in costly altruistic acts 
abroad. . . . [because] they have . . . a moral duty, in virtue of their 
election, their oath, and their identity, to promote the welfare of the 
State and its citizens.231 
Goldsmith’s analysis of cosmopolitanism is presented in the context of 
international law, and specifically with respect to demands on the 
United States to engage in cosmopolitan actions such as the ratification 
of global treaties and the engagement in humanitarian action even “if 
doing so would lower net U.S. welfare.”232 But the argument is easily 
amenable to the constitutional domain, since its ultimate foundation is a 
conception of constitutional democracy. As Goldsmith writes, “the U.S. 
Constitution—and, with different mechanisms, every liberal 
democracy—ties foreign policy action to voter preferences.”233 He 
continues: “the State does not organize itself for the purpose of engaging 
in acts of cosmopolitan charity. The dominant purpose of any State is to 
create a community of mutual benefit for citizens and other members, 
and more generally to preserve and enhance the welfare of 
compatriots.”234 
The conclusion is not that cosmopolitanism should be abandoned 
altogether, but that it should be adapted to plausibility constraints 
inherent in the logic of democracy. “Cosmopolitan argument must be 
bounded by institutional and moral constraints that arise in the 
domestic-democratic sphere. We cannot even have a coherent ideal of 
liberal democracies’ cosmopolitan duties unless we understand these 
realistic limits on what liberal democracies can do.”235 As I mentioned, 
those limits are not static and they might shift in time in all directions, 
including toward cosmopolitanism. But until and unless that shift 
happens, respect for democracy demands resistance to actions contrary 
to the general welfare of the U.S. electorate. Put differently, such respect 
demands that cosmopolitan sensibilities not transform into 
cosmopolitan action. 
To understand the extent of this challenge, it helps to focus first on 
the gamut of “cosmopolitan action,” in Goldsmith’s sense, in 
constitutional law. If cosmopolitan sensibilities make a push for 
 
these circumstances.  
 231 Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 1685–86.  
 232 Id. at 1668. 
 233 Id. at 1679. 
 234 Id. at 1676–77. 
 235 Id. at 1669. 
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cosmopolitan action in constitutional law, such actions are likely to be 
deemed undemocratic if they are not independently anchored in non-
cosmopolitan grounds. Consider, for instance, the authority of foreign 
law in constitutional interpretation. Extrapolating from Goldsmith’s 
conception from the international sphere, the use of foreign law would 
be illegitimate presumably because the specifically legal authority of 
such sources would have no possible democratic cover. As the question 
is rhetorically framed in this context, what is specifically legal in the 
relevance of foreign law? 
From a purely source-based perspective, it might look as if foreign 
law lacks the kind of second-order authority that is specifically legal. 
Yet, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, there is a difference between the 
norms that lack any legal authority, for instance a religious norm or a 
norm of etiquette, and one that “aspires to juridical status.”236 Unless 
cosmopolitan norms can fit into such a category,237 their law-ness and 
their traction will remain unexplainable. In the domestic-oriented 
interpretation that I have put forth, this insight is all the more relevant 
because the right to hospitality—which has traditionally been seen as the 
hard law aspect of Kant’s program in Perpetual Peace—plays an 
important, though somewhat ancillary, role. My claim, however, is that 
the integrated spaces of constitutional law create a field of constitutional 
gravity that anchors norms which aspire to judicial status. 
On the substance of Goldsmith’s challenge, the first difference to 
note concerns not so much legal legitimacy but, rather, law’s societal 
effect. As we have seen, Goldsmith believes, like Kant, that education 
can shape people’s sensibilities in a cosmopolitan direction. However, 
until the education process has delivered that type of sensibility, 
cosmopolitan action that does lower U.S. welfare should be rejected as 
undemocratic. But for Goldsmith, this is a one-way street. He finds no 
shaping effect or general influence of the overall legal framework on the 
outlook of law’s subjects. In the case of the United States, which is 
Goldsmith’s main concern, the lack of cosmopolitan sensibilities is also 
due to a conception of exceptionalism, or nationalism, that percolates 
through the system’s capillaries. 
Kant did not merely note this shaping effect of law—he placed it at 
the center of his philosophical approach.238 As is well known, Kant’s 
conception of law and his political philosophy follow his general 
philosophy of history. As we have seen, Kant’s Enlightenment approach 
to history is stage-based. Each stage sets in place the learning processes 
 
 236 Waldron, supra note 171, at 96. 
 237 Id. at 95. 
 238 See KANT, supra note 9, at 113 (“[W]e cannot expect [people’s] moral attitudes to 
produce a good political constitution; on the contrary, it is only through the latter that the 
people can be expected to attain a good level of moral culture.”). 
PERJU.35.2 (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2013  4:21 PM 
2013] C O S MO PO L IT AN IS M  759 
that create the environment in which progress to the next step is 
possible.239 Hence, peace is built on a process of civilization and 
education that enables “a universal cosmopolitan existence.”240 As one 
commentator writes, “[o]nce enlightenment has progressed far enough 
and people have achieved a proper understanding of and respect for 
universal principles of human rights, republicanism, and international 
and cosmopolitan right, then the time will be ripe for the transition to a 
global juridical condition.”241 
Goldsmith does not share this view of law’s effect. Perhaps such a 
view of law’s shaping effect is naïve. There is abundant literature on 
constitutional salience showing the limited effect of the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional pronouncements on American society 
generally,242 despite self-congratulatory views to the contrary. But it is 
unclear if the empirical grounds are the most appropriate for gauging 
these issues, since testing them is almost impossible. Consider, for 
example, the issue of temporal horizon. The “civilizing effect”243 of 
democracy is no less real for having been observed over a long span of 
time. Considered within any short period, the effect would have been 
invisible. The same goes for laws’ shaping effect on citizenry’s 
cosmopolitan sensibilities. The question remains, on what ground one 
view—which finds a shaping effect—is justified over another, which 
does not. The answer lies with the philosophy of history. Kant believed 
that history moves in a certain direction, and “the goal towards which 
history is moving is the establishment of a republican civil 
constitution.”244 Because of that belief, he looked at historical evidence 
with what contemporary social scientists would refer to as a 
“confirmation bias.”245 That is undeniable. But just as undeniable is that 
Goldsmith’s approach also has a confirmation bias. The fault line, at 
least in this case, then becomes the philosophy of history rather than the 
empirical evidence of a very complex legal and social reality. 
I will show how this plays out with regard to the interpretation of 
democracy. Although both conceptions are committed to the idea of 
self-government, their interpretations of democracy are different. At 
 
 239 On common learning processes, see generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND 
NORMS (1998). 
 240 KANT, supra note 9, at 51. 
 241 KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 62 (emphasis omitted). 
 242 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 1991); Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—and the 
Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2006); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of The First 
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 
(2004). 
 243 The phrase is questionable in any other interpretation but one: NORBERT ELIAS, THE 
CIVILIZING PROCESS (1969). 
 244 Reiss, supra note 36, at 37. 
 245 KLEINGELD, supra note 7, at 175. 
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one end is Goldsmith’s challenge that cosmopolitanism takes for 
granted a conception of constitutional democracy that can be called, 
following Ronald Dworkin, “statistical” democracy. It sees democratic 
rule as the aggregation of the preferences of the majority. Kant’s 
conception is different, and no less a conception of democracy because 
of it. The point of the rule of law, according to Kant, is to put 
preferences to the discipline of reason—indeed, the very possibility of 
freedom rests on the primacy of reflection. It is only in those 
circumstances, when preferences do not express unreflective taste or 
self-interest, that freedom is ever possible. 
One way to get to this difference is to understand it as a matter of 
political culture, shaped by historical experience. Jed Rubenfeld has 
distinguished American and European approaches to the relation 
between reason and will within these two political cultures.246 He traced 
the differences in the conceptions of democracy to the impact and 
meaning of the Second World War in the two societies.247 It is, of 
course, important not to caricature these different traditions as 
homogeneous. As we have seen in Lorraine Weinrib’s discussion of 
constitutional convergence in Part I, the “rights-based model of 
constitutionalism” has its origins in the United States, specifically in the 
jurisprudence of the Warren court.248 Yet, despite their complexities and 
nuances, it remains possible to identify different dominant approaches 
across constitutional jurisdictions. Kant can be situated at the very 
foundations of the European Enlightenment that has shaped the 
European approach. There is some truth to this account. Kant’s 
blindness to the nationalism that ravaged Europe in the twentieth 
century has been duly noted.249 
Misunderstanding this point about freedom makes one prone to 
misread Kant’s general conception. The connection between democracy 
and eternal peace, in particular the role of peace in making freedom 
possible, has proven to be a trap for some commentators. In a recent 
article, Robert Delahunty and John Yoo use Kant’s focus on domestic 
justice to argue against the interpretation of the Kantian project that 
would require the creation and expansion of supranational and 
transnational institutions.250 Instead, they argue that democracy-
promotion recognizes “the necessity and desirability of a plurality of 
independent nation states,”251 and consequently, that “[i]f the world 
 
 246 Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 (2004). 
 247 Id. 
 248 Weinrib, supra note 81, at 84 (“The Constitution of the United States provided the 
inspiration for the rights-protecting constitutions of liberal democracies throughout the 
world.”). 
 249 Habermas, supra note 12, at 146 (discussing Kant’s “blind[ness]” to nationalism). 
 250 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 13. 
 251 Id. at 440. 
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becomes [more] Kantian, it will be by the pursuit of national self-
interest.”252 It is quite difficult to see how the emphasis on national self-
interest, without any qualification regarding its dovetailing to other 
polities as well as broader goals, can make the world more Kantian. For 
one, in a Kantian framework, the construction of national self-interest 
by a self-governing political community is part of that community’s 
process of understanding human interdependence as the foundation of 
human progress. Furthermore, and this is more than a stylistic 
difference, there is no celebratory tone in Kant when it comes to the 
existence of a plurality of states. Rather, that reality is simply a state of 
affairs—and possibly an unstable one at that—given inescapable features 
about the world. The authors further identify “democracy as a point of 
agreement between Kantians and those who view international politics 
through a more instrumental lens,” and argue that peace would look 
“like the invisible hand of the market, in that democracies pursuing 
their own self-interest in an anarchic international system will produce 
gains for global welfare.”253 But this ignores the fact that Kant’s 
argument is based on his philosophy of history, which associates moral 
progress with learning processes as humanity makes its way from one 
state of enlightenment to the next. The authors may reject this view of 
history but they must acknowledge its existence and engage with it, 
since Kant’s philosophical argument is incomprehensive if detached 
from it. 
My point is that the idea of democracy does not by itself do the 
work that the critics of cosmopolitanism expect from it. The battle will 
take place on the territory of different interpretations of democracy. 
Conversely, it is true that cosmopolitanism will be vulnerable from the 
perspective of some conceptions of democracy. But the question then 
becomes one of the cogency of those interpretations, especially in 
relation to the conception of self-government that informs the 
cosmopolitan approach. 
B.     The Challenge from History 
A second challenge to cosmopolitanism in constitutional law uses 
the dark history of European colonialism to question the universal 
vocation of the cosmopolitan ideal. Specifically in the context of Kant’s 
philosophy, this challenge seeks to expose how its Eurocentrism—Kant 
claimed that Europe would “probably lead the way”254—shows it to be 
 
 252 Id. at 461. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Koskenniemi, supra note 11, at 7–8.  
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imperialistic in its disregard of the diversity of cultures.255 Under the 
guise of accommodation and toleration hid colonial ambitions and 
insensibilities that are specifically Western in their historical pedigree. 
Western in this context means European, although in the second-half of 
the twentieth century, the universality of law is arguably perverted 
though a specifically American cast. Projects of constitution-making 
under the guise of the Washington Consensus, promoted by United 
States-influenced international institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are evidence for this charge.256 
Thus: “scratch a cosmopolitan and you’ll find an imperialist just below 
the surface.”257 
Consider again the distinction between integrative and contractive 
comparisons. Whereas the analysis of the right-based constitutionalism 
exemplified integrative comparisons, the challenge from history tends to 
extoll the contractive virtues of encounters between different republican 
constitutions. From this latter perspective, the argument about 
constitutional convergence is based on a typical disregard of difference. 
The Kantian scholar is like the traveler who sees of the new places he 
visits only elements that are already familiar.258 He or she sees nothing 
new that can challenge his or her deep-seated beliefs, not because the 
novelty does not exist, but rather because it simply does not register. 
This account does violence to the richness of different constitutional 
cultures and leads to a very impoverished model of integrative 
constitutional analysis.259 
The historical pedigree of cosmopolitanism is sufficiently complex 
to suggest that the historical challenge is very real. As one scholar 
commented on that legacy, “Kant’s so-called universal conception of 
justice was not only regional to Europe but was also regional within 
Europe.”260 Going now beyond Europe, the argument has been exercised 
 
 255 Tully, supra note 12, at 331–58.  
 256 MAZOWER, supra note 17, at 66.  
 257 BROWN, supra note 3, at 127. 
 258 Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 411 (1985). 
 259 Günter Frankenberg has termed this the Ikea model of constitutional comparison, in 
Günter Frankenberg, Constitutional Transfer: The IKEA Theory Revisited, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
563 (2010). 
 260 Ian Hunter, Kant’s Regional Cosmopolitanism, 12 J. HIST. INT’L L. 165, 178–79 (2010) 
(“Kant’s cosmopolitan or global spatialisation of justice results from the same metaphysical 
reciprocity that he establishes between the community of space in a spherical earth, and the 
community of wills formed among the rational beings seeking to occupy this space. . . . [T]he 
only truly legitimate form of political authority for Kant is that exercised by a world republic; as 
it is only the harmonisation of wills of the entire universe of rational beings that makes just 
possession of the earth possible and that is actualised in the cosmopolitan right of the 
republican cosmopolis. Cosmopolitan right (or international law) is thus both autonomous of 
and superior to any right claimed by territorial states.”); see also Tully, supra note 12. 
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in the context of Chinese, or generally Asian, cultural and legal values.261 
Yet, authors do use Kant to try to make sense of the evolution of those 
legal systems. This argument is also based on rather simplistic 
assumptions about the homogeneity of cultures. As Amartya Sen has 
argued, the origins of salient features of democratic life can be traced to 
the Indian culture in equal measure as to the Greek.262 
This challenge points to real risks. There is a risk that the so-called 
cosmopolitan is “infected by the particularity of the speaker, the world 
of his or her experience, culture and profession, knowledge and 
ignorance.”263 Furthermore, there is a real risk that one glosses over the 
relevant dissimilarities and focuses instead on the comfort of the similar. 
It might even be true that cosmopolitanism, of Kantian or other types, is 
particularly prone to inflicting such violence on the rich and 
multidimensional constitutional cultures. 
But these are only risks, and are not disproportionate risks. 
Cosmopolitanism is not among those concepts with a history so dark 
that it cannot be rescued from it. The mere pointing to the European 
origins does not make the approach inescapably Eurocentric, just like 
the concept of the state itself is not Eurocentric, despite its origins.264 
Moreover, I pointed out the need for a principle of ordering in the case 
of integrative comparisons such as Weinrib’s. But a similar principle of 
ordering is needed in the case of contractive comparisons that focus on 
the dissimilar, the singular. In principle, one has no more reason to 
extoll the unique or the different as one has to extoll similarities. There 
are dangers to erring on both sides. 
The challenge from history is not a fatal blow to the cosmopolitan 
approach, but its warning must be heeded. In law as elsewhere,265 
globalization can be a cover under which particular interests present 
themselves as universal and, as such, claim to be beyond justification or 
criticism.266 Constitutional law can become a tool that is used to ends 
that violate Kant’s principle of self-determination. The question is 
whether there are mechanisms that protect from this danger. The 
absence of supranational structures ensures that each system retains 
autonomy over all cross-constitutional interactions. Consider how, in 
 
 261 For thoughtful discussions, see WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); Amartya Sen, Human Rights 
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this context, American law has been more of the object of “aversive” 
than positive comparisons.267 Many courts around the world, including 
young courts such as Hungary’s or South Africa’s, refer to the decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court in order to openly criticize their 
reasoning, dismiss them, and chose alternative paths.268 
That said, it should be acknowledged that the challenge from 
history cannot be answered satisfactorily without an account of how the 
constitutional law of other systems is processed and handled within any 
given jurisdiction. This is the traditional domain of comparative law. 
Only such an account could show the structure of learning processes 
and how they fit into the Kantian framework. 
C.     The Challenge from Politics 
The challenge from politics takes two forms. The first form, which 
is related to the challenge from history, points out the risk that 
cosmopolitanism hides the political preferences and options that are 
involved in any jurisprudential choice behind its claim to neutrality. 
Recall in this context the account of the rights-centered constitutional 
paradigm, and in particular how the description glossed over the 
jurisprudential choices and tensions involved in its articulation. The 
challenge of politics takes that as an example of the “managerial 
mindset,”269 understood as the belief that the structuring and exercise of 
political power is a matter of effective management through neutral 
techniques, rather than substantive choices. By opening up the 
microcosm of the state to the globalization phenomenon, traditional 
distributive concerns will become diluted in a sea of technicalities whose 
power consequences will become hidden but which remain equally 
consequential. As one scholar put it, we become “ruled by experts who 
structure their world to deny themselves the experience of discretion 
and responsibility and the rest of us the opportunity to challenge their 
 
 267 Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case For Studying 
Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003). 
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action.”270 The danger of cosmopolitanism, from this perspective, is that 
of a politically aseptic theoretical framework that is blind to the 
distributive consequences of a legal act, method, or indeed “paradigm.” 
Shifting the register from government to governance deepens the 
disconnect between the state and power and removes, both in practice 
as well as in discourse, power mechanisms from the state’s oversight. To 
the extent that legal discourse can orient the legal system to provide 
some oversight to the exercise of power in society, cosmopolitanism can 
short-circuit that capacity by enlarging the framework of reference to 
such an extent that participants find themselves reverting to clean, 
technical, neutral expertise. Yet, that expertise only hides the 
inescapable political choices that everyone, experts included, are bound 
to make.271 
The challenge from politics points to real risks. To the extent that 
awareness increases both reflectiveness on the part of decision-makers 
and transparency of the very process of deciding, any choice, whether it 
is part of a process of globalization or the object of constitutional 
convergence, must be justified. However, the challenge is exaggerated if 
it suggests that such justification is impossible within a cosmopolitan 
framework. Cosmopolitanism is neither more nor less than one of “the 
many possible worlds.” It is just like alternative frameworks, including 
nationalist ones. The insights brought out by the challenge from politics 
become a trap if built into the challenge itself is a bias for the small and 
bounded community. Cosmopolitanism does expand the legal space, 
which comes with the risk of a heightened appeal of fake neutrality. At 
the same time, however, it also has the advantage of offering a 
framework in which constitutional self-knowledge and self-
understanding can be deepened. 
 
 270 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 647. 
 271 The challenge from politics relies heavily, at least in this version, on the role of legal 
professionals. Consider, for example, that cosmopolitanism changes the paradigm from 
hierarchy to network, from unity to plurality. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal 
Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1 GLOBAL 
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constitutional authority). As David Kennedy writes, 
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experience that things don’t add up, that coherence fails, that incommensurability 
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rule of law for what it is—a dream. Seeing this, perhaps we can take another look at 
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through our rulership. 
Kennedy, supra note 2, at 641, 644 (emphasis added). 
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But this defense of cosmopolitanism might itself seem too abstract 
and theoretical. Past constitutional and political argument shows a 
propensity to hide ideological projects behind the fake neutrality of 
cosmopolitanism. Projects of democratic promotion are perhaps most 
prominent in this context. Foreign interventions in the name of 
democracy-promotion and state-building have been justified by the 
unqualified thesis that constitutional republics are peaceful and 
democracies do not go to war.272 Some of these accounts rely on the 
democratic peace literature, although many scholarly accounts in this 
tradition typically show far greater nuance.273 In fact, democracy-
promotion interventions cannot find a basis in Kant's account because 
they violate the principle of self-government. Perpetual Peace rejects 
foreign interventions as contrary to the ideal of democratic self-
determination. The fact that cosmopolitanism can be misinterpreted 
and misused, like all-powerful intellectual tools, cannot count as an 
argument against it. 
There is another version of the challenge from politics. Whatever 
the descriptive accuracy of the case for republican constitutions, this 
view holds that cosmopolitanism should be resisted because it 
entrenches a set of institutional structures that become ossified and end 
up straightjacketing the flow of politics. Consider here the very 
definition of republican constitutions. In defining them, Kant walks the 
fine line between being under-inclusive, with the risk of making it 
difficult to distinguish them from other regimes, and being over-
inclusive. The danger in this latter instance is precisely the one singled 
out in the challenge, namely that the existence of a unique and 
nonderogable institutional framework will leave voiceless the interests 
and visions that the framework fails to capture. The two versions of the 
challenge from politics converge in that the single institutional 
framework is likely to be presented as the only possible alternative. 
The stakes are particularly high, if one recalls that according to 
Kant, republican constitutions are the only ones that make freedom 
possible. The very idea of a republican constitution, with its 
commitment to self-government, freedom, and equality, require 
constant experimentation with institutional form. Scholars have 
suggested the inclusion of “destabilization rights” in constitutions, 
precisely as a way of freeing politics from the entrenchment of particular 
interests.274 Rather than convergence, this challenge posits that the 
world needs institutional experimentation and innovation. 
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Exactly how well Kant handles the challenge is a matter of some 
controversy. James Tully, for example, finds that in “Kant’s account the 
constitution of every free and independent nation-state should be the 
same.”275 At the same time, we have seen that Kant’s emphasis is on 
some requirements of institutional structure—the separation of powers 
and representation—as well as normative principles of freedom—
equality and self-government. Moreover, as we have seen in Part IV, the 
determination of constitutional meaning leaves open the avenue for a 
variety of interpretations of these principles,276 as well as a variety of 
forms that the separation of powers can take. Yet, from Tully’s 
perspective, Kant’s insistence that each citizen be treated “as free and 
equal” assumes an impartiality of liberal democratic pedigree that is 
biased against the value of cultural difference.277 
 To be sure, Kant’s account of cosmopolitanism is avowedly liberal. 
That feature is no liability and, indeed, the challenge from politics 
cannot succeed simply by mounting a critique from an alternative, 
communitarian perspective. The real question is whether Kant’s account 
of the republican constitutions is indeed over-determined and, 
therefore, runs the risk of stifling experimentation. Debate is possible on 
this front but the argument concerning stifling is rather weak. Nothing 
in the idea of cosmopolitanism suggests that it cannot be interpreted in 
a way that does not require replication of institutional structure. As we 
have seen, convergence is not uniformity. That applies both with respect 
to the interpretation of rights as well as to the separation of powers or 
other elements of institutional structure. Moreover, the lack of a 
supranational structure signals the continuation of the plurality of 
different constitutional jurisdictions. That plurality is in fact the 
guarantee that institutional experimentation remains possible and 
indeed desirable. This is another important argument, in addition to the 
argument from despotism, in favor of maintaining the plurality of states 
and rejecting the world republic. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have drawn on the tradition of cosmopolitanism to 
construct a normative framework for the cross-jurisdictional 
interactions of legal systems. I referred to these phenomena as elements 
of laterally-conducted constitutional integration in order to emphasize 
that interactions of this type occur outside pre-established institutional 
settings. Where do these interactions fit within Kant’s tripartite system 
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of public law: municipal, international, and cosmopolitan? I argued that 
Perpetual Peace does not answer the question, because its author failed 
to anticipate that once republican constitutional orders come into 
existence, their normative commitment to (self-)government under law 
brings them into interaction with one another. Nevertheless, Perpetual 
Peace offers an overall framework for theorizing these phenomena. 
Specifically, it constructs the levels of public right in a way that makes it 
possible to place cross-constitutional interactions at the intersection 
between the different levels, rather than within any one of them. The 
lesson is that the rights of humanity cannot be incorporated within any 
one level of public right, and hence are not captive to any one set of 
institutional arrangements or conceptual structures.  
Within this general theoretical structure, I argued that the 
municipal perspective should be recognized a privileged standpoint. By 
contrast to other scholarly accounts, which associate a cosmopolitan 
view to top-down accounts about institutional reform at the 
international level or universal moral demands, my account has taken 
domestic constitutionalism as both starting and end points. In this 
sense, I have defended a bottom-up version of cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitanism from the ground-up preserves the primacy of the 
domestic jurisdictions: each republican constitutional order retains the 
filter of its own discourse and structures as it integrates and internalizes 
the constitutional experiences of other republican constitutions. The 
commitment to self-government and human rights requires that the 
filter of the domestic system be preserved. I have shown how the turn to 
domestic constitutionalism is not a turn away from the others, and the 
cosmopolis. To the contrary, deep within domestic constitutionalism, 
we discover not only our own political community, but the world. 
Constitutionalism is a welcoming home for the cosmopolitan ideal in 
law. 
